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HOW RATING AGENCIES ALLOW PREDATORY LENDING TO
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[David Reiss*]
I.

INTRODUCTION

Predatory lending is today’s most pressing consumer protection issue, costing
American families over an estimated nine billion dollars a year.1 Predatory lending is
particularly rampant in the subprime home equity loan market – inhabited largely by
unsophisticated borrowers – where lenders have made billions upon billions of dollars of
loans with abusive terms.2 After years of legislative and regulatory neglect, state
governments have, in recent years, produced a variety of reforms and regulations on the
terms and methods of lending in the subprime market, in an attempt to ameliorate the
worst aspects of predatory lending.
Specifically, in the last few years, many states have enacted laws to limit abusive
home lending practices within their own jurisdictions.3 Large segments of the lending
industry opposed these laws, claiming that the resulting regulatory patchwork increases
their compliance costs, exposes even the most law-abiding lender to liability, and thereby
ultimately increases loan costs for consumers.4
In large part as a result of these complaints, momentum is building on three
fronts to standardize the operations of the subprime mortgage market. First, federal
banking regulators in the Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) and Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS) have already preempted the application of state predatory
lending laws to a broad array of lending institutions. Following the regulators’ leads
Congress also considering legislation to preempt more broadly their application to the
remaining financial institutions still subject to state laws.5
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1. Christopher A. Richardson, Predatory Lending and Housing Disinvestment, at 19-20 (Feb. 2003)
(estimating annual cost of predatory lending to be $9.53 billion), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=338660; Stein, Eric, Quantifying the Cost of Predatory Lending at 3 (2001)
(estimating the annual economic cost of predatory lending to be $9.1 billion), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Quant10-01.pdf.
2. See infra Part II.B.
3. See infra Part V.
4. See id.
5. See infra Part VI.A.
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Second, two Government-Sponsored Entities6 (“GSEs”) Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac (sometimes referred to collectively as “the GSEs” and sometimes as “Fannie and
Freddie”) , the two largest purchasers of residential mortgages on the secondary mortgage
market (the “secondary market”),7 indicated that they would not purchase loans from
loan originators that contain certain terms they deem abusive, such as harsh prepayment
penalties, as well as those loans that are most heavily regulated by predatory lending
laws.8
Finally, Standard & Poors, Moody’s Investors Services and Fitch Ratings, the
three major bond and securities rating agencies (collectively, the “Privileged Raters”),
indicated that they will not rate securities9 backed by pools of residential mortgages if
any of those mortgages violate their rating guidelines relating to acceptable liability risk
stemming from state predatory lending laws.10 Rating agencies are in the business of
providing credit ratings11 for pools12 of mortgages that are sold to investors throughout
the world, a process known as securitization. The lack of a rating from at least one of the
Privileged Raters, which effectively grant regulatory licenses to institutions who wish to
issue securities,13 is the financial equivalent of a death sentence for a residential
mortgage-backed securities14 offering.
6 The term “GSE” refers to “a federally chartered, privately owned, privately managed financial institution
that has only specialized lending and guarantee powers and that bond-market investors perceive as implicitly
backed by the federal government.” Carnell, Richard Scott, Handling the Failure of Government-Sponsored
Enterprise, 80 WASH.L.REV 565 (forthcoming, August 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=745486,
at 2. I use the term “GSEs” as a shorthand for Fannie and Freddie, unless otherwise noted, notwithstanding
the fact that other entities such as the Federal Home Loan Bank System (the “FHLBS”), are also GSEs. See
id.
7. The market for mortgage-backed securities is known as the “secondary mortgage market” or “secondary
market,” for short. Amy Crews Cutts, et al., Adverse Selection, Licensing and the Role of Securitization in
Financial Market Evolution, Structure and Pricing at 2 n.1 (July 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=280388. The secondary mortgage market is easiest to
visualize as “a network of lenders who sell and investors who buy existing mortgages or mortgage-backed
securities. This infusion of capital from investors provides mortgage lenders such as banks, thrifts, mortgage
bankers and other loan originators with a market for their interests.” KENNETH G. LORE AND CAMERON L.
COWAN, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES § 1.1 (2003).
8. See infra Part VI.B.
9. There is no single legal definition of a “security.” For the purposes of this article, “security” shall mean
any instrument, such as a mortgage note, “that might be sold as an investment.” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494
U.S. 56, 61 (1990) (defining “security” for purposes of the Securities Acts).
10. See infra Part V.
11. Generally, a credit rating is an evaluation of creditworthiness. Moody's has defined it as an “opinion of
the future ability, legal obligation, and willingness of a bond issuer or other obligor to make full and timely
payments on principal and interest due to investors.” Philippe Jorion et al., Informational Effects of
Regulation FD: Evidence from Rating Agencies, J. FIN. ECON. at 7, (May 2004) (citing Moodys’ Investor
Service, Ratings Definitions. (2003)), forthcoming at http://ssrn.com/abstract=556824
12. A “pool” is a group of similar financial instruments combined for resale to investors on the secondary
market. See LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 1.1.
13. See infra Part IV.B.
14. “Mortgage-backed security” is the general term for “any investment security representing an interest in,
or secured by, one or more pools of mortgage loans.” LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 1.1. “The term
"mortgage-backed security" is often used to describe securities backed by a wide variety of mortgage
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Advocates for the lending industry frequently promote the increased
standardization of the secondary market as an approach that will reduce predatory
behavior without hurting legitimate lenders.15 But each of the three methods of
standardization described above must be independently evaluated to determine whether it
is desirable.
As a preliminary matter, one should also consider the legitimacy of the entity
promoting each method of standardization. Obviously, the federal government has broad
constitutional authority to regulate financial institutions. This legitimacy, however, must
be balanced against the significant role in banking, consumer protection and real estate
law that is granted to the states in our federalist system of governance. While the GSEs
are private companies, they are federally chartered to provide ongoing assistance to the
secondary market so as to help low- and moderate-income individuals become
homeowners.16 Thus, the GSEs have been granted some legitimacy in setting policy in
this sphere.
The Privileged Raters, however, have no similar mandate. They define their role
first and foremost as protectors of investors.17 And while they have been granted a
privileged regulatory status by the Securities and Exchange Commission and other
government regulators,18 they have not been assigned a reciprocal responsibility to the
public, as the GSEs have been. As a result of this mismatch between privilege and
responsibility, those concerned with the rights of homeowners should meet the Privileged
Raters’ efforts to impose standardization on the mortgage market with greater skepticism.
The most significant criticism of the federal preemption of state predatory
lending laws is that it is too soon to do so.19 Predatory lending has only arisen as a
significant problem in the last decade and not enough time has passed to say whether
legislators and regulators have come up with the best solution to the problem.20 States,
playing their traditional role as laboratories for policy experimentation, should be left
alone a while longer until the relative merits of different approaches to the problem can
be compared.
The GSE approach is probably the most limited of the three and the one least
likely to harm homeowners. This is because GSEs must balance their profit-seeking with
the effectuation of their public purpose.21 Because Congress and the media watch them
interests in almost every conceivable form of real property.” Id. For some historical accident, securities
backed by HELs and HELOCs are sometimes referred to as asset-backed securities. See W. Alexander
Roever et al., Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC) Securitizations, in, THE HANDBOOK OF NONAGENCY
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, 115, 115 (Frank J. Fabozzi et al., eds., 2d ed., 2000) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK]. Securities backed by any other asset (such as credit card receivables) are referred to as “assetbacked securities.” MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, GLOBAL CREDIT ANALYSIS 451 (David Stimpson ed.,
1991) [hereinafter STIMPSON].
15. See id.
16. See infra Part III.B.
17. See infra Part IV.C.
18. See infra Part IV.B.
19. See infra Part VI.A.
20. See id.
21. See infra Part III.B.
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carefully and because they have competitors in the secondary market, the GSEs’
incremental approach is likely to do some good: it should reduce the number of loans
with abusive terms without exercising an effective veto over state predatory lending
laws.22
Unsurprisingly, the most worrisome of the three approaches to standardization is
that of the Privileged Raters. The Privileged Raters have implemented guidelines relating
to predatory lending legislation that do not accurately measure the risk that such statutes
pose to investors. In particular, they exaggerate the risk posed by assignee liability and
punitive damages provisions in such legislation.23 Ultimately, these guidelines have had
two major impacts: (i) they promote the interests of issuers and investors over those of
homeowners and (ii) they promote the growth of the residential mortgage-backed
securities market.24 Not coincidentally, the Privileged Raters make more money in such
a growing market because they charge issuers for their work in rating new securities;
thus, it is in the Privileged Raters’ self-interest to keep states from passing laws that slow
secondary market growth and cut into their income.25
There is no way to formally or informally appeal the decision of the Privileged
Raters. And because there is no adequate way to exercise public pressure on them, their
misjudgments interfere with legitimate state policies to the benefit of the Privileged
Raters themselves, which amounts to an abuse of the privileges that they have been
granted by government regulators. The Privileged Raters’ actions have caused some state
legislatures to water down predatory lending bills under consideration and have caused
others to amend and dilute existing predatory lending laws so that the Privileged Raters
will continue to rate pools containing loans from states with such laws.26 This is because
funds for loans can dry up in a jurisdiction that has enacted a tough predatory lending law
that falls afoul of the Privileged Raters’ guidelines. As this catastrophic scenario has
already occurred in one state, others have quickly learned that the Privileged Raters have
an effective veto over their predatory lending laws.27
This article will review all three efforts to standardize the subprime mortgage
market, but will focus on the Privileged Raters’ actions because they present a serious
and unjustified impediment to the remediation of serious abuses in the home mortgage
market that has not yet received thorough scholarly attention.
*

*

*

In order to understand how Privileged Raters became so enmeshed with
predatory lending, we must first understand how two related processes work: (i) the
marketing of subprime loans to consumers and (ii) the role of the Privileged Raters in the
expansion of the subprime mortgage market.
22. See infra Part VI.B.
23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Part VI.C.
25. See infra Part VI.C.
26. See infra Part V.
27. See id.
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To explain these processes, this article builds on a growing body of predatory
lending and rating agency literature. Professors Kurt Eggert, Kathleen Engel and Patricia
McCoy have documented and explained the link between predatory lending and the
secondary market.28 Professors Claire Hill, Frank Partnoy and Steven Schwarcz have
documented and explained the role of rating agencies in the broader financial markets.29
The aim of this article, building on these two bodies of work and on the significant
economics and finance literature relating to rating agencies, is to demonstrate that
Privileged Raters are playing an active, albeit hidden, role in permitting predatory lending
to thrive. A limitation of the existing rating agency literature, at least for my purposes, is
that it has not evaluated their impact on predatory lending and, thus, on the public
interest. The term “public interest”, for the purposes of this article, refers to the
expressed preferences of a political entity, such as one might find in a law passed by a
state legislature. As far as this body of literature is concerned, the only relevant parties
are investors, issuers and the agencies themselves. I add the public to that list.
In Part II of this article, I describe the process of marketing subprime loans to
consumers and describe the way predatory lending grew alongside the extraordinary and
rapid expansion of the subprime lending market.
In Part III, I explain how mortgages are securitized and sold. Part III also
describes how the GSEs created a standardized secondary market for prime loans and
how they are in the process of standardizing aspects of the subprime secondary market.
In Part IV, I describe the function of rating agencies in the securitization process
as well as the process by which they arrive at their ratings. Part IV also describes how
the Privileged Raters have been granted a privileged regulatory status by financial
services regulators. Finally, this Part reviews recent finance scholarship that suggests
that the Privileged Raters are biased against the public interest in general and the interest
of homeowners in particular.
In Part V, I outline existing remedies for predatory lending and describe in detail
the impact of the Privileged Raters on the structure of three state predatory lending laws
enacted in North Carolina, Georgia and New Jersey. In Part V, I also document how the
Privileged Raters had overreacted – and continue to overreact -- to those statutes. The
state-specific detail of Part V is necessary for my argument for two reasons. First, states
are the battleground upon which financial companies like the Privileged Raters have
fought against increased regulation of the secondary market. Second, the events in each
state are merely battles in a broader war between local control and international capital
28. See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due
Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 511-13 (2002) [hereinafter Eggert, Held Up]; Kurt Eggert,
Held Up in Due Course: Codification and the Victory of Form Over Intent in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35
CREIGHTON L. REV. 363 (2002) [hereinafter Eggert, Codification]; Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy,
A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2002)
[hereinafter Three Markets]; Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, Predatory Lending: What Does Wall
Street Have to Do with It? 15 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 715 (2004) [hereinafter Engel & McCoy, Wall Street].
29. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L. REV. 43, 44 (2004); Frank
Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77
WASH. U. L. Q. 619, 711 (Fall 1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating
Agency Paradox, 2002 U.ILL.L.REV. 1, 15 (2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=267273.
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market standardization and this intangible and ongoing war cannot be understood without
those details. In sum, Part V provides a case study of how the Privileged Raters’
privileged regulatory status distorts the efficient functioning of the financial markets to
the advantage of financial market participants and to the detriment of the public interest.
In Part VI, I review the impact that federal preemption, the GSEs and the
Privileged Raters have on the healthy standardization of the subprime secondary market.
I conclude that federal preemption is premature; GSEs are having an incremental and
beneficial impact on the subprime market; and the Privileged Raters are having a
negative impact.
In Part VII, I build on various reforms suggested in the rating agency literature to
propose public policy responses to the standardization imposed by rating agencies on the
secondary market. A thorough exploration of such proposed solutions must be left to a
later article. Nonetheless, by applying the insights of the predatory lending and rating
agency literature to the events surrounding the adoption of recent state predatory lending
legislation, this article makes visible the distortions that the Privileged Raters have
caused in the secondary market, particularly as it affects the public interest.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF PREDATORY LENDING
A.

The Explosive Growth of the Subprime Mortgage Market

The way that Americans borrow money to buy their homes has changed radically
since the 1980s.30 Before that time, Americans who wanted to buy a home would
typically walk into their local savings and loan and speak to a loan officer who would
evaluate their application.31 Depending on income, wealth and ties to the community,
the loan officer might approve a loan. And typically, only those with a healthy, or
“prime,” profile were approved.32 That is, they had a steady work history; a large down
payment; and no problems with their credit.33
30. See AMY CREWS CUTTS et al., ON THE ECONOMICS OF SUBPRIME LENDING at 1 (January 27, 2004)
(Freddie Mac), available athttp://www.freddiemFac.com/news/pdf/subprime_012704.pdf; Michael J. Lea,
Innovation and the Cost of Mortgage Credit: A Historical Perspective, 7 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 147 (1996)
[hereinafter Historical Perspective] (describing history of mortgage lending in United States from 1830s to
1990s); Michael J. Lea, Sources of Funds for Mortgage Finance, 1 J. HOUSING RES. 139, 150 (1990)
[hereinafter Sources of Funds] (describing role of government in mortgage lending from Great Depression
through 1980s).
31. See Robert Van Order, The U.S. Mortgage Market: A Model of Dueling Charters, 11 J. HOUSING RES.
233, 233 (2000) (“Between the end of World War II and the 1970s, U.S. residential mortgage markets were
dominated by the primary market, which was comprised primarily of specialized depository institutions
(mainly savings and loan associations [S&Ls], more broadly “thrifts”), which both by regulation and tax
incentive were induced to hold most (about 80 percent) of their assets in mortgages.”).
32. “Prime” mortgages share certain characteristics relating to their “type, duration, age, performance, and
other specific criteria.” Rating agencies generally agree that prime mortgages share the following
characteristics in common:
first lien on single family detached properties for use as a primary residence located in the United States;
fixed-rate level fully amortizing payments; 80% Loan to Value, as established by a competent appraiser;
$400,000 (Standard & Poor’s limit); [and] standard, complete Freddie Mac/ Fannie Mae documentation.
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Thrifts34 were not only the dominant type of lender, but they also vertically
dominated the residential mortgage market: they originated and serviced the mortgage
typically holding it until paid off by the borrower.35 Now, technological,36 financial37
and legal38 innovations allow global finance companies to offer a range of mortgage
products to a broad array of potential residential borrowers. As a result of these
innovations, there has been an unbundling of the submarkets of the mortgage industry.
Now, a mortgage can be
1. originated by a mortgage broker who makes money only from origination;
2. serviced by a mortgage banker who did not originate the loan and may have
bought the right to service the loan from another mortgage banker;
3. originated with the credit risk taken by one of the secondary market
institutions, perhaps along with a mortgage insurance company; and
4. funded by a mortgage-backed security (MBS) sold into the capital markets,
and the MBS can be packaged as a bundle of derivative securities that
separate interest rate and prepayment risk among different investors. 39
A highly beneficial consequence of this change has been the economies of scale that
specialized firms have been able to achieve, which has resulted in rated MBS transactions
trading at only a small discount to Treasuries Bills of comparable maturity.40 This has
driven down the average interest rate paid by homeowners.41 In part because of those
changes, American homeownership had reached a historic high of 69 percent and
SECURITIZATION: ASSET-BACKED AND MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES § 9.04.B. (Ronald S. Borod, ed.,
2003) [hereinafter BOROD].
33. Debra Pogrund Stark, Unmasking the Predatory Loan in Sheep’s Clothing: A Legislative Proposal, 21
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 129, 131-32 (2005) (describing typical post-World War II loan application
process).
34. The term “thrifts” is a catchall that includes savings and loans, savings banks, mutual savings banks and
credit unions.
35. Van Order, supra note 31,at 233.
36. See Andrea Heuson et al., Credit Scoring and Mortgage Securitization: Implications for Mortgage Rates
and Credit Availability, J. OF REAL EST. FIN. AND ECON. 23:3, 337-363 (2001) (“With the recent advent of
automated underwriting, much of the informational advantage [of mortgage originators] has disappeared. As
the argument goes, computerized credit scoring gives the securitizer more accurate and timely information
about borrower creditworthiness.”).
37. CUTTS & VAN ORDER, supra note 30, at 1 (“U.S. mortgage markets have evolved radically in recent
years. Innovations in underwriting, mortgage products, and mortgage funding have expanded mortgage
lending and reduced costs.”).
38. See, e.g., US GAO, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN
COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 21[hereinafter CONSUMER PROTECTION] (“Report to the Chairman and
Ranking Minority Member, Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate) (January 2004). (“Several factors
account for the growth of the subprime market, including changes in tax law that increased the tax advantages
of home equity loans . . ..”).
39. Van Order, supra note 31,at 233 -34;.
40. Id. (“Pools of mortgages (MBS and their derivatives) and debt backed by pools of mortgages now trade in
national and international markets, almost as efficiently as Treasury securities.”).
41. Id.
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Americans had 9.6 trillion dollars in home equity in 2004.42 Indeed, lenders refinanced
trillions of dollars of mortgages in 2003 and 2004.43
“Subprime” lending has been a significant and growing portion of this activity,
reaching nearly 20 percent of all originations in 2004.44 Subprime lending is the
extension of credit to those with lower incomes, less wealth and riskier credit profiles
than traditional, “prime,” borrowers.45 A negative consequence of the change in the
mortgage industry away from dominance by the thrifts and toward relatively unregulated
specialty firms has resulted in a variety of abuses in the subprime portion of the
secondary market.
Subprime lenders typically offer three types products to borrowers.46 First,
refinance and purchase mortgages are offered to borrowers with poor credit histories.47
In many cases, borrowers refinance mortgages for an amount greater than the balance of
the original mortgage, thereby taking “cash out” of their homes.48 Second, “Alt A”
mortgages are made to borrowers with FICO scores similar to those in the prime
market.49 Alt A mortgages are typically made to borrowers who cannot document all of
the information in their loan application (“low doc” or “no-doc” loans); Alt A mortgages
can be used either for a purchase or a refinance.50 Third, high loan-to-value (“LTV”)51
refinance mortgages are originated to borrowers with relatively good credit but who have
LTV ratios that sometimes are as high as 150 percent.52

42. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING
2005 at 1 (2005) [hereinafter HOUSING STUDIES].
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. CUTTS & VAN ORDER, supra note 30, at 1; see HUD, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH,
SUBPRIME MARKETS, THE ROLE OF GSES, AND RISK-BASED PRICING at 8 (March 2002) [hereinafter THE ROLE
OF GSES]. (Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 12 USC § 1735f-7a, and
Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act of 1982, 12 USC § 3801 et seq., “provide the legal framework
for subprime lending, except in states that opt out of the legislation.”); Baher Azmy and David Reiss,
Modeling a Response to Predatory Lending: The New Jersey Home Ownership Security Act of 2002, 35
RUTGERS L.J. 645, 652 (2004) (discussing range of factors that have led to increase of subprime lending).
46. THE ROLE OF GSES, supra note 45, at 4.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The FICO ratings system, created by the Fair Isaac Corporation, gives individual consumers credit
scores that are meant to predict whether they will pay their debt obligations as expected by lenders. See Fair
Isaac Website, http://www.fairisaac.com/Fairisaac/Solutions/Scoring++Predictive+Modeling/Credit+Bureau+Risk+Scores.htm. Some argue that Alt A mortgages are not as safe as
genuine “A” mortgages; see CUTTS & VAN ORDER, supra note 30, at 4.
50. THE ROLE OF GSES, supra note 45, at 4. “No document” loans are made to borrowers who have irregular
income, such as those working on commission. Because their recent income statements may not reflect their
income accurately, lenders will rely on high credit scores and a higher interest rate to ensure that they are
adequately protected against the additional risk of lending to such individuals. Id.
51. That is, the principal amount of the loan is very high in relation to the value of the house that is
mortgaged to secure that loan. Until the 1990s, residential lenders typically limited the LTV to 80%.
52. THE ROLE OF GSES, supra note 45, at 4.
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Subprime loans have higher interest rates than prime loans, a fact that lenders
ascribe to the subprime borrowers’ greater risk of default.53 A number of studies have
estimated that subprime interest rates for “C” and “D” subprime loans are on average four
percentage points higher than those for prime loans.54 Generally, subprime lenders also
charge higher points and fees – charges assessed at the outset of the loan and paid either
in cash or financed into the overall loan proceeds – to compensate for higher origination
and servicing costs that lenders claim that subprime loans have.55 In the aggregate, loan
performance data appears to support the view that a significant portion of the excess
spread56 covers the higher risk of default among subprime loans: as of September, 2002,
3.36 percent of subprime mortgages in the A- range and 21 percent of D mortgages were
seriously delinquent.57 These rates of delinquency were far higher than those in the
prime market, where only 0.54 percent of loans were seriously delinquent as of that
date.58
Most subprime loans are now originated by mortgage and consumer finance
companies, with a smaller amount issued by banks and thrifts.59 And only 16 percent of
subprime mortgages are used for home purchases.60 That is, most subprime mortgages
are used to refinance existing mortgages. The growth of subprime lending has been
utterly explosive. In 1994, subprime mortgage originations were $34 billion;61 in 2003
they represented more than ten percent of all originations, over $300 billion.62 The
secondary market provides much of the liquidity and capacity for growth for the

53. HUD-TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING
27-28 (2000) [hereinafter JOINT HUD-TREASURY REPORT].
54. JOINT HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 53,at 28. Within the subprime market, grades of A -, B, C,
and D are assigned to represent progressively higher credit risks carrying correspondingly higher interest
rates. See JOHN WEICHER, THE HOME EQUITY LENDING INDUSTRY: REFINANCING MORTGAGES FOR
BORROWERS WITH IMPAIRED CREDIT (1997).
55. Id. at 67. It remains unclear, however, the extent to which subprime loan terms accurately reflect an
inherent market risk of default associated with their borrowers. See CUTTS & VAN ORDER, supra note 30, at
5.
56. Excess spread is “the difference between (1) interest received at the weighted average interest rate on the
mortgage collateral and (2) the sum of interest paid at the passthrough rate on the bonds and any monthly
fees. Abner Figueroa, The Evaluation of Excess Spread in Sub-Prime Transactions, in HANDBOOK, supra
note 14, at 209, 209. For instance, if the weighted average interest rate of a pool of mortgages was seven
percent and the sum of interest paid (including fees) was six percent, the excess spread would be one
percentage point. That excess spread may be used to cover the higher costs of subprime lending and any
remainder may be kept by the issuer and /or shared with investors.
57. THE ROLE OF GSES, supra note 45, at 19.
58. Id.
59. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 21. In 2001, 178 lenders concentrated primarily on subprime
mortgage lending. 59 percent of those lenders that concentrated on the subprime market were independent
mortgage companies such as mortgage banks and finance companies; 20 percent were nonbank subsidiaries
of financial or bank holding companies; 10 percent were federally regulated banks and thrifts; and the
remaining lenders were other types of financial institutions. Id.
60. THE ROLE OF GSES, supra note 45, at 5.
61. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38,at 21.
62. Id.
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subprime market.63 Indeed, in 2003, “approximately two-thirds of the outstanding
subprime/home equity loans in the United States were securitized . . ..”64
This growth has allowed many people who had not been able to access the prime
market to access the equity in their homes. This greater access to credit in the subprime
market has come at the cost of significantly higher fees and interest rates than a prime
borrower would face.65 It has also come at the cost of significantly higher fees and
interest rates for minority borrowers as compared to white borrowers and these higher
costs are not efficiently related to the comparative credit risk of white and minority
borrowers.66 In other words, the subprime market in the aggregate appears to
discriminate to some extent against communities of color.
Communities of color have been disproportionately represented in the subprime
market in contrast to their representation in the prime market. African Americans and
Hispanics combined made up less than eight percent of the prime home purchase
mortgage market in 1998, but such borrowers made up nearly 20 percent of subprime
home purchase mortgage market in that same year.67 Similarly, African American and
Hispanic borrowers combined make up about six percent of all prime conventional
refinance mortgages and 17 percent of subprime refinance mortgages.68 And fully half
of all loans in predominantly African-American communities are subprime, compared to
only 9% of loans in predominantly white communities.69
B.

Predatory Lending in the Subprime Market

The subprime market is far less regulated and standardized than the prime
market. As such, it presents an opportunity for those seeking to separate financially
unsophisticated borrowers from the equity that they have in their homes, that is, it
presents an opportunity to engage in predatory lending.70 Most predatory behavior takes

63. See THE ROLE OF GSES, supra note 45,at 9.
64. Engel & McCoy, Wall Street,, supra note 28,at 719 n.4.
65. See Michael S. Barr, Modes of Credit Market Regulation, in BUILDING ASSETS, BUILDING WEALTH;
CREATING WEALTH IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky, eds., 2005)
(reviewing credit market price discrimination literature), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=722611, at 6.
66. Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as Laboratories of
Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 321- 326 (2005).
67. THE ROLE OF GSES, supra note 45, at 5.
68. Id.
69. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME AND RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME
LENDING IN AMERICA 3 (2000) [hereinafter UNEQUAL BURDEN]. In 1998, 26% of refinance loans in lowincome communities were subprime, compared to a national average of 11% and to 7% in upper income
communities. Id. This may partially be the result of the lower income-to-asset ratios and shorter or weaker
credit histories found amongst such borrowers.
70. See Eggert, Codification, supra note 28, at 511-13 (surveying variety of definitions of predatory lending
proposed by scholars and regulators); See also Three Markets, supra note 28,at 1260 (suggesting that
predatory loans include those that (i) are structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to
borrowers; (ii) engage in rent seeking; (iii) involve fraud or deceptive practices; (iv) lack transparency; and
(v) require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress).
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place between a mortgage broker or mortgage banker and the borrower.71 But such
thinly funded entities could not exist with funding from secondary market investors. This
article focuses on how states have attempted to make secondary market investors
accountable for their role in propagating predatory lending, thereby incentivizing them
stop it.72
While the extent to which predatory lending has infiltrated the subprime market
cannot be known precisely,73 “it is rare to find a case of a predatory lending that does not
involve a subprime lender,” as opposed to a prime lender.74 Predatory lending is also far
more common in the “refinance” or “home equity” market75 than in the home purchase
market because home equity borrowers have much more equity in their home than
purchasers; this existing home equity gives predatory lenders a greater opportunity to
pack a loan with excessive fees that might not be readily identifiable by the borrower
who need not pay such increased costs out-of-pocket as a new homeowner would.76
While there is no generally accepted comprehensive definition of predatory
77
lending, the United States Government Accountability Office has cobbled together a
good working description: it is “an umbrella term that is generally used to describe cases
71. See generally Lawrence Hansen, In Brokers We Trust: Using Mortgage Licensing Statutes as A Response
to Predatory Lending, __ J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEV. __ (forthcoming 2005) (on file
with author) (describing predatory practices by originators).
72. See Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 28, at 716 (“If the secondary market has the incentive and
ability to deter predatory lending through such market devices as pricing, contract provisions, due diligence,
and monitoring, then the market for subprime mortgages arguably will self-correct.”).
73. There is no systematic data on predatory lending in large part because the principle source of information
on mortgage lending is data reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 USC § 2801, et seq.
(“HMDA”), and does not include reporting on interest rates, fees, points, and other costs that might be
indicative of predatory practices. See Harold L. Bunce et al., Subprime Foreclosures: The Smoking Gun of
Predatory Lending?, 257, 257- 259,in HOUSING POLICY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
(Susan M. Wachter and R. Leo Penne, eds., 2001). Notwithstanding these limitations, HMDA data “is the
most comprehensive source of information on primary mortgage originations and secondary market loan
purchases.” Randall M. Scheessele, HMDA COVERAGE OF THE MORTGAGE MARKET 4 (HUD Working Paper
No. HF-007, 1998). HMDA data does provide information on the borrower, such as income, race, ethnicity
and sex, as well as information regarding the property to be mortgaged, such as location. See id.
74. Dan Immergluck, Stark Differences: Explosion of the Subprime Industry and Racial Hypersegmentation
in Home Equity Lending, in HOUSING POLICY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 235, 237
(SUSAN M. WACHTER AND R. LEO PENNE, eds., 2001).
75. Charles Schorin et al., Home Equity Loans, in HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 79, 83. The term “home
equity loan” covers a many different products; it includes the traditional second lien mortgage, but “it more
commonly today refers to first liens to borrowers with impaired credit histories” and/or high debt-to-income
ratios. Id. The boundaries between the secondary market for traditional residential mortgage-backed
securities and HEL-backed securities are expected to blur over time. Id. Home equity loans are typically
used to “consolidate consumer debt in a lower, tax deductible form[;] reduce a homeowner’s monthly
mortgage payment by extending the loan’s term[;] finance home improvements[;] monetize equity in the
home[;] finance temporary liquidity needs, such as for education or medical expenses.” Id. at 84-85.
76. See CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 20 (“According to federal and industry officials, most
predatory mortgage lending involves home equity loans or loan refinancings rather than loans for home
purchases.”).
77. See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 45,at 649 (discussing difficulties of comprehensively defining predatory
lending).
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in which a broker78 or originating lender takes unfair advantage of a borrower, often
through deception, fraud, or manipulation, to make a loan that contains terms that are
disadvantageous to the borrower.”79 Accordingly, the GAO has defined predatory
lending so as to include the following abusive practices and loan terms:
• Excessive fees. Abusive loans may include fees that greatly exceed the amounts
justified by the costs of the services provided and the credit and interest rate risks
involved. Lenders may add these fees to the loan amounts rather than requiring
payment up front, so the borrowers may not know the exact amount of the fees they
are paying.
• Excessive interest rates. . . . [L]enders may charge interest rates that far exceed
what would be justified by any risk based pricing calculation, or lenders may “steer”
a borrower with an excellent credit record to a higher-rate loan intended for
borrowers with poor credit histories.
• Single- premium credit insurance. Credit insurance is a loan product that repays the
lender should the borrower die or become disabled. In the case of single-premium
credit insurance, the full premium is paid all at once—by being added to the amount
financed in the loan—rather than on a monthly basis. . ..
• Lending without regard to ability to repay. Loans may be made without regard to a
borrower’s ability to repay the loan. In these cases, the loan is approved based on the
value of the asset (the home) that is used as collateral. In particularly egregious cases,
monthly loan payments have equaled or exceeded the borrower’s total monthly
income. Such lending can quickly lead to foreclosure of the property.
• Loan flipping. Mortgage originators may refinance borrowers’ loans repeatedly in a
short period of time without any economic gain for the borrower. With each
successive refinancing, these originators charge high fees that “strip” borrowers’
equity in their homes.
• Fraud and deception. Predatory lenders may perpetrate outright fraud through
actions such as inflating property appraisals and doctoring loan applications and
settlement documents. Lenders may also deceive borrowers by using “bait and
switch” tactics that mislead borrowers about the terms of their loan. Unscrupulous
lenders may fail to disclose items as required by law or in other ways may take
advantage of borrowers’ lack of financial sophistication.

78. Independent mortgage brokers typically sell loans that they originate to lenders for premiums ranging
from 2% to 5%. FITCH IBCA, SUBPRIME HOME EQUITY: WHAT NEXT? 8 (Apr. 27, 1999).
79. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 18.
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• Prepayment penalties. Penalties for prepaying a loan are not necessarily abusive,
but predatory lenders may use them to trap borrowers in high-cost loans.
• Balloon payments. Loans with balloon payments are structured so that monthly
payments are lower but one large payment (the balloon payment) is due when the
loan matures. Predatory loans may contain a balloon payment that the borrower is
unlikely to be able to afford, resulting in foreclosure or refinancing with additional
high costs and fees. Sometimes, lenders market a low monthly payment without
adequate disclosure of the balloon payment.80
Predatory practices are not typically present in the prime market. Indeed, they are not
present in much of the subprime market,81 where low- and moderate-income borrowers
are concentrated.82 But they are used to prey on unsophisticated homeowners, typically
those who are not integrated in the sphere of mainstream financial institutions such as
banks and credit unions.83
According to the Senate hearing testimony of an anonymous employee of a predatory
lender,
my perfect customer would be an uneducated widow who is on a fixed income –
hopefully from her deceased husband’s pension and social security – who has her
house paid off, is living off of credit cards, but having a difficult time keeping up her
payments, and who must make a car payment in addition to her credit card
payments.84
Such predatory practices lead to foreclosure: from January 1998 through September
1999, “the foreclosure rate for subprime loans was more than 10 times the foreclosure
rate for prime loans.”85 While the increased credit risk of subprime borrowers explains
part of this extraordinary differential, it also appears to be the result, in large part, of
predatory lending.86
III.

THE ROLE OF SECURITIZATION IN THE PREDATORY LENDING
CRISIS

80. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 18- 19 (footnote omitted).
81. See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 45,at 655 -56 (discussing tactics of predatory lenders).
82. UNEQUAL BURDEN, supra note 69, at 3.
83. See James H. Carr et al., August 2001. Financial Services in Distressed Communities: Framing the Issue,
Finding Solutions 6 (August 2001) (Fannie Mae Foundation) (“As many as 12 million households in the
United States either have no relationship with traditional financial institutions or depend on fringe lenders for
financial services. These households are disproportionately poor and minority.”).
84. EQUITY PREDATORS: STRIPPING, FLIPPING AND PACKING THEIR WAY TO PROFITS: HEARING BEFORE THE
SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of “Jim Dough,” Anonymous Employee,
Finance Co.), available at http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr14jd.htm (Mar. 16, 1998).
85. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 23-24.
86. Id. at 24 (arguing that predatory lending is probable factor in increase in rate of subprime foreclosures).
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Real estate has always been considered to be good collateral87 because it needs
little monitoring compared to other types of collateral, such as inventory, equipment and
other personal property.88 And yet, Wall Street investors have historically viewed
mortgages as riskier investments than those assets because they were regulated by a
patchwork of local and state laws.89 It is in large part because of this aversion that prior
to the 1970s, all real estate lending, like all politics, was local.90 Local lenders lent to
local borrowers.91 Wall Street had ceded these local mortgage markets to local lenders
for these reasons and because of the common belief that local lenders had more insight
into local conditions.92 This state of affairs was to change with the birth of securitization
and the growth of the secondary market.
A.

Securitization Explained

Most simply put, securitization “refers to the aggregation and pooling of assets
with similar characteristics in such a way that investors may purchase interests or
securities backed by those assets.”93 A more complex picture of securitization would add
in the appraisals done to ensure the value of the collateral; the third party credit
enhancements offered by entities such as insurance companies; and the complex
structures of the securities themselves.94
Given this complexity, it is not surprising that the typical investor in a securitized
pool is an institutional investor which is purchasing such securities either in the
secondary market or through a private placement.95 Securitizations are carefully
structured to achieve precise tax, accounting and regulatory treatment to make them
87. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Is Secured Debt Efficient? 80 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1134-35 (2002) [hereinafter
Secured Debt].
88. See, e.g., id.
89. See LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 1.11. They were also viewed as riskier because mortgages were
necessarily tied to local economies and a local recession or natural disaster could increase defaults and
decrease the value of a pool of geographically-concentrated mortgages. Id.
90. See Joseph Philip Forte, Capital Markets Mortgage: A Ratable Model For Main Street And Wall Street, in
COMMERCIAL SECURITIZATION FOR REAL ESTATE LAWYERS REAL ESTATE FINANCE IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS:
RISKS AND REWARDS 4-6 (ALI – ABA CLE, 2004).
91. Id.
92. See id. at 4-6.
93. BOROD, supra note 32, at § 1.01.A.; see Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future
of Security, 25 CARDOZO L. R. 1655, 1656 n.1 & 1657 n.6 (2004) (providing thorough, albeit not
comprehensive, review of securitization literature). The terms “securitization,” “asset securitization,” and
“structured finance” are often used interchangeably. DAVID G. GLENNIE et al., SECURITIZATION 205 (1998);
see also TAMAR FRANKEL, I SECURITIZATION , at 3 (2004 supp.) (stating that securitization transforms
“illiquid debt into securities”).
94. See Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 1061, 1063
(1996); LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 1.4 (identifying typical third party providers of credit
enhancements as banks and insurance companies that offer various complex products to meet the needs of
proposed securities issuances); JOHN FRANCIS HILSON AND JEFFREY S. TURNER, ASSET-BASED LENDING: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SECURED FINANCING § 2:6.2 (2003) (describing various forms of credit enhancements).
95. See Hill, Secured Debt, at 1131.
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attractive to such investors.96 The net result of the securitization process is that the
investors in asset-backed securities come to own “the rights to the present and future
economic value of the assets.”97
Typically, securitizations are designed to result in “securities that are of high
quality, as evidenced by a high rating, and saleable on the capital markets.”98 The
process of securitization thereby allows a firm with a less-than-perfect credit rating to
spin off some of its receivables, such as mortgages, into an instrument that is capable of
having a higher rating than the firm itself.99 An additional benefit of securitization is that
it allows investors to manage various forms of risk that are inherent in the underlying
receivables. Thus, the underlying credit risk of the receivables can be managed through
credit enhancements and due diligence; prepayment risk is managed through pricing; and
litigation risk (bankruptcy consolidation, originator fraud) is managed by choice of
securitization structure.100
The basic market requirements for securitizations to thrive are standardized
contracts; grading of risk via underwriting; historical statistics of performance of similar
assets;101 standardization of applicable laws; standardization of servicer quality; reliable
supply of quality credit enhancers;102 and computers to handle the complexity of the
necessary analyses.103
A typical securitization involves the following steps:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

selection ("pooling") of the receivables to be conveyed by the company
originating the transaction (the “originator”);
creation of a special purpose entity (“SPE”) which buys rights to
payment from the selected receivables from the originator;
creation of a second SPE (the "pool") to which the rights to the selected
receivables will be conveyed;
establishment of the terms of the securities to be issued by the pool;104
conveyance of the receivables to the pool;

96. See id. at 1130.
97. BOROD, supra note 32, at § 1.01.A.
98. Hill, supra note 94, at 1073.
99. See id.
100. Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 28, at 728.
101. Lewis S. Ranieri, The Origins of Securitization, Sources of Its Growth, and Its Future Potential, in A
PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 31, 40 (Leon T. Kendall and Michael J. Fishman, eds., 1997) [hereinafter,
PRIMER]; Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 28,at 720 (“ subprime securitizations are a fairly new
phenomenon relative to their prime counterparts, meaning that the performance of subprime loan pools over
time is not yet well understood.”).
102. Richard Roll, Benefits to Homeowners from Mortgage Portfolios Retained by Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, 23 J. OF FIN. SERVICES RES. 29, 29 (2003) (“It is impossible to overstate the importance of credit
enhancement in the process of mortgage securitization, one of the most prominent and striking features of the
secondary market.”).
103. Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American Finance, in PRIMER, supra note 101, at 7.
104. The terms (the interest rate, for instance) of the securities are typically different from the terms of the
underlying mortgages. See A Low-, supra note 93,at 1067- 68.
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(6)
(7)

(8)

issuance of the pool securities in a public offering or by private
placement;
establishment of mechanisms by which the receivables will be collected
(“serviced”), and the amounts collected will be held until payment to the
pool's securities holders; and
issuance of the rating agency's rating and the insurer's guaranty.105

The conveyance of the receivables through two SPEs is done to protect them from being
consolidated with the potential bankruptcy estate of the originator of the pool, which
could interrupt the flow of payments to the investors.106 This disaggregation of the risk
inherent in the receivables and the risk inherent in the issuer lowers the effective cost of a
securitization and thereby increases the value of the receivables to the issuer.107
Once the securitization is complete, the second SPE uses the proceeds of the
issuance to pay the first SPE for the transferred assets which in turn uses the proceeds to
pay the originator. The investors are repaid over time from the principal and interest
payments made by the mortgagors (the borrowers in the underlying loan transactions).108
The resulting securities may be either debt or equity securities, depending on the structure
of the transaction and the perceived needs of the potential investors.109 (The
securitization process is outlined in Table 1.
While an individual securitization of receivables can easily top a billion
dollars,110 the securitization process is conceptually much the same as any financing or
receivables purchase transaction that could be obtained from a bank or finance
company.111 Indeed, nearly any type of asset with a regular stream of cash payments can
be securitized112 – although certain assets, such as residential mortgages have turned out
to be particularly attractive candidates.
Key attractions of investing in asset-backed securities, as opposed to individual
assets, are that it allows an investor to simultaneously choose a narrow type of investment
that is likely to meet its investment criteria while (i) reducing due diligence costs by
delegating a large portion of such tasks to specialized third parties such as rating
105. See Hill, supra note 94, at 1077- 78 (describing steps of typical securitization).
106. Plank, supra note 93,at 1664.
107. Id. at 1662. This lowering of the cost of securitization effectively comes at the expense of potential
creditors of the originator should it file for bankruptcy. See id. at 1657 & n.6 (2004) (reviewing literature that
suggests that securitization is detrimental to the unsecured creditors of the originator and that securitization
can be a technique for judgment proofing).
108. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539 (2004) (describing
process of securitization), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=386601.
109. Joseph Philip Forte, Solving the Mortgage Tax Barrier to Defeasance, in COMMERCIAL SECURITIZATION
FOR REAL ESTATE LAWYERS REAL ESTATE FINANCE IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS: RISKS AND REWARDS 416 (ALI
– ABA CLE, 2004).
110. See, e.g., WELLS FARGO HOME EQUITY TRUST 2004-1.
111. See HILSON & TURNER, supra note 94, at § 2:6.1 (2003); see also FRANKEL, supra note 93, at 4 (arguing
that a security is much like a debt, albeit one that is very liquid).
112. See COMMITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY AND CORPORATE REORGANIZATION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, STRUCTURED FINANCING TECHNIQUES 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 532 (1995).
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agencies;113 (ii) spreading interest rate, credit and geographic- and sector-concentration
risk114 over a number of similar assets; (iii) reducing the likelihood of interruptions of
cash flows by the systemization of cash flows from a large pool of assets; and (iv)
providing greatly improved liquidity over that of the individual assets that are
securitized.115
Issuers obviously incur certain transaction costs in securitizations, such as rating
agency fees and insurance premiums, that they would not incur by holding the mortgages
in their own investment portfolios, but securitization also allows for certain cost-savings
that frequently outweigh the additional costs; indeed, a rational issuer will only securitize
receivables where it believes that the benefits of securitization exceed the transactional
costs.116
The securitization of residential mortgages, in particular, is attractive to loan
originators because, mortgages themselves are not easily traded in a secondary market.117
To be attractive to investors, each mortgage would require its own extensive and
expensive evaluation and monitoring as each typically has its own unique terms and risks.
These unique characteristics would make mortgages of limited interest on secondary
markets that rely on standardization to reduce the transaction costs associated with
conveying assets from one party to another.118 Since the 1970s, investors have become
quite comfortable investing in residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) because
the standardization of mortgage terms overcame these problems.119 And the
securitization of subprime mortgages, in particular, took off when RMBS were designed
with characteristics that insulate them from the increased level of credit risk from the
underlying subprime mortgage collateral pool.120

113 . See Ranieri, supra note 101, at 38 (“Securitization starts to break down as a concept when the issuer
imposes on the investor the responsibility of analyzing the underlying collateral.”).
114. See BOROD, supra note 32,at § 1.03.B.1. For instance, by pooling mortgages from across the country,
the pool reduces risks associated with changes in local economic conditions as well as risks associated with
natural disasters. Id.
115. See id. at §§ 1.01.D, 1.02A.2 and 1.02A.5 (outlining benefits of securitization); see Michael C. McGrath,
Structural and Legal Issues in Securitization Transactions, in ASSET-BASED FINANCING 2004, at 612-13 (PLI,
2004) (describing additional benefits of securitization); LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 1.19 (same); Alan
C. Hess et al., Elements of Mortgage Securitization, 1 J. OF REAL EST. FIN. AND ECON. 331, 338 (1988)
(same).
116. See Plank, supra note 93,at 16 69.
117. See Hill, supra note 94,at 1074- 75; Peter M. Carrazzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765, 778 (2005) (“Without a standardized mortgage document and uniform lending
techniques, the secondary market never would have gotten off the ground.”).
118. See id.; Eric Bruskin et al., The Nonagency Mortgage Market: Background and Overview, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 5, 20 (“Standardization of loan programs nationwide has been a key element
facilitating the development and evolution of today’s massive MBS market.”).
119. LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 1.11. RMBS standardization in the 1970s was driven by secondary
market purchasing standards set by Government-Sponsored Entities. Carrazzo, supra note 117, at 797
(noting that Fannie and Freddie agreed that first order of business was development of standard mortgage).
120. See THE ROLE OF GSES, supra note 45,at 9.
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B.

Government-Sponsored Entities Create the Secondary Market

Mortgages have always been bought and sold by investors, but until recently the
secondary market has been an informal arrangement.121 The introduction of residential
mortgage-backed securities changed that: once RMBS are issued, they can be easily
traded on the secondary market with comparatively few transaction costs.
The most important factor in the development of the secondary market has been
the creation of two Government-Sponsored Entities by the federal government: the
Federal National Mortgage Association122 (now known as “Fannie Mae” and sometimes
referred to as “Fannie”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation123 (now
known as “Freddie Mac” and sometimes referred to as “Freddie”).124 Indeed, these two
entities, along with the Government National Mortgage Association125 (GNMA and
often referred to as Ginnie Mae), have made the United States secondary residential
mortgage market “the envy of every other country,”126 one that has driven down the cost
of mortgage credit for tens of millions of borrowers.127 While these entities had created
a secondary market for certain loans prior to 1970, the broad secondary market began in

121. Van Order, supra note 31,at 236.
122. Id. at 236-37. Fannie Mae is the oldest of the GSEs, created in the 1930s as a government-owned
secondary market for loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration. Id. At first it operated by issuing
its debt and purchasing mortgages that it held in its portfolio. Id. In 1954, it was reorganized to allow private
capital to replace federal funds. Historical Perspective, supra note 30, at 164. In 1968, it was moved off the
federal budget and converted into a GSE. In the 1970s, it switched its focus to conventional loans. Van
Order, supra note 31, at 236-37.
123. Van Order, supra note 31,at 236 -37. Freddie Mac was created in 1970
to be a secondary market for the S&Ls. (At the time, it dealt only with S&Ls, and Fannie Mae dealt with
mortgage bankers. Now both institutions deal with the same originators.) Like Fannie Mae, it is a private
GSE and also is off-budget. It initiated the first MBS program for conventional loans in 1971, while
Fannie Mae began its conventional MBS program in 1981. Both GSEs’ MBS are similar to GNMA’s;
for example, both protect investors against credit risk but not interest rate risk. . . . Both Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac fund a significant (about 40 percent) share of their mortgages with debt . . ..”
Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 236-37. GNMA was created in 1968 to handle Fannie Mae’s policy -related tasks and to provide a
secondary market for government insured loans. It is on the federal budget as part of the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). GNMA was responsible for promoting the major innovation in
secondary markets, the MBS. . . . GNMA deals only in federally insured mortgages, primarily those insured
by the FHA and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, which account for 10 to 15 percent of the market.”
Id.; see PETER J. WALLISON et al., NATIONALIZING MORTGAGE RISK: THE GROWTH OF FANNIE MAE AND
FREDDIE MAC 7 (2000) (noting that because Ginnie Mae can obtain funds for FHA and VA loan purchases at
lower rates than any of its competitors (including Fannie and Freddie), “it faces no competition for these
products.”).
126. ROLL, supra note 102, at 29.
127. Van Order, supra note 31,at 236 -37. Fannie and Freddie have both been rocked by accounting scandals
in the last year; as a result, there are calls on many fronts to modify their regulatory status. See, e.g., Stephen
Labaton, Limits Urged in Mortgage Portfolios, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at C1 (describing attempts to
increase oversight over the two companies).
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earnest with the passage of the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, which allowed
the GSEs to purchase and securitize conforming mortgages.128
In this section I will outline in more general terms the growth of the secondary
market; in the following section, I will take a closer look at the role of the GSEs in the
creation of the secondary market.
A leading commentator describes two distinct stages in the development of
securitization.129 The first stage, in the 1970s, centered on the use of pass-through
securities.130 But pass-through RMBS left prepayment, interest rate, and residual credit
exposure risks with investors. These risks significantly limited the pool of potential
investors.131 The second stage, which began in earnest in the 1980s, centered on the
division of cash flows and/or credit risk into tranches132 that met the specific needs of
different classes of investors.133
In the late 1970s, “the primary condition” necessary for the explosion of RMBS
securitization came about: “a funding shortfall.”134 That is, the strong desire for home
ownership and the rapid escalation of housing prices created a demand for residential
mortgages that the S&Ls could not meet.135 Wall Street firms responded and were
successful over time changing tax laws to permit the tax-free pass-through of cash
flows from home loans to mortgage securities, thereby avoiding double taxation, in
modernizing the investments powers of institutional investors and in developing the
computer technology needed to create new securities out of cash flows and to track
the cash flows.136
As investors needed to evaluate the risk of MBS default, and because that is a
difficult task, specialists stepped forward to provide such services. The Privileged Raters
have become preeminent providers of evaluations of the riskiness of mortgage-backed
securities.137 Thus, the development of credit ratings by rating agencies such as Standard
128. 12 USC § 1451 et seq. See Carrazzo, supra note 114, at 765 (providing history of secondary mortgage
market).
129. Kendall, supra note 103, at 15.
130. Typically, the term “pass-through securities” refers to those securities for which investors are paid out of
their percentage ownership share of a securitized pool’s cash flow. See HILSON & TURNER, supra note 94, at
§ 2:6.2 (2003).
131. See Kendall, supra note 103, at 15.
132. A “tranche” is a set of securities secured by a particular pool of collateral that has risk, reward, and/or
maturity characteristics that differ from the other tranches secured by the same pool.
133. Securities and Exchange Commission, Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organization 70 Fed. Reg. 21,306 (April 25, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8570.pdf, at 11-20 (last visited August 12, 2005) [hereinafter
Proposed Definition].
134. See Kendall, supra note 103, at 6.
135. Id.
136. Id. (providing firsthand account of early history of securitization); see RANIERI, supra note 101, at 34
(same).
137. LOUIS H. EDERINGTON & Jess B. YAWITZ, THE BOND RATING PROCESS, in HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS, Ch. 23, p. 3 (Edward I. Altman ed., 6th ed., 1987).
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& Poor’s and Moody’s became key elements in the effort to increase confidence that
investors had in such securities.138 And as investor confidence grew, so did the rating
business.139
The impact of securitization has been so great, that it is no exaggeration to say
that it is
one of the most important and abiding innovations to emerge in financial markets
since the 1930s. It is changing the face of American and world finance. A revolution
has occurred in the way the borrowing needs of consumers and businesses are met.
The historic use of financial intermediaries to gather deposits and lend them to those
seeking funds is being supplemented and even replaced by securitization processes
that bypass traditional intermediaries and link borrowers directly to money and
capital markets.140
During the 1970s, the primary purchasers of RMBS were Fannie and Freddie as
well as the thrifts.141 Since the funding shortfall of the late 1970s, commercial banks,
insurance companies, pension funds and mutual funds, among other investors, have
become large, frequent and active investors in that market.142 Investment in RMBS took
off after those institutional investors entered the market: indeed, the RMBS market has
increased by more than 500 percent from 1984 through the early 2000s.143
Starting sporadically in the late 1970s, non-federally-related issuers such as
commercial banks and mortgage companies began to issue residential mortgage-backed
securities.144 These “private label” RMBS are issued without the governmental or quasigovernmental guaranty that a federally-related issuer, such as a GSE, would give and are
typically backed by non-conforming loans.145 The development, however, of private
label RMBS was “hampered by credit risk concerns.”146 Private label securitization
gained momentum during the Savings and Loan crisis in the early 1980s, when Wall
Street firms identified “a unique opportunity to profit from the thrift crisis by proffering

138. See LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 1.11.
139 . See Kendall, supra note 103, at 14 (“The credit rating agencies welcomed the emergence of ratable
securities as a new product line that would increase corporate revenues through new issues and subsequent
rating review fees.”); ROY C. SMITH & INGO WALTER, RATING AGENCIES: IS THERE AN AGENCY ISSUE?, in
RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 291 (Richard M. Levich et al.eds., 2002)
(“The rating business has grown with the process of financial disintermediation, as bank debt has been
replaced by securities issued in one financial market after another . . ..”).
140. Kendall, supra note 103, at 1.
141. LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 1.3.
142. Id. at § 1.3; Bruskin, supra note 118, at 9 (providing history of nonagency securitization from late 1970s
through mid-1980s).
143. LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 2.22 and § 1.3.
144. Forte, supra note 90, at 4-6.
145. See LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 2.22.
146. Forte, supra note 90, at 4-6.
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the securitization exit strategy as the solution to the thrifts' residential portfolio
dilemma.”147
By the 1990s, the types of mortgage-backed securities that were offered in the
private-label mortgage market became increasingly complex, moving from single-class
mortgage-backed securities to multiclass Collateralized Mortgage Obligation
(“CMO”)148 and Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (“REMIC”) structures.149
And then, starting in the mid-1990s, a significant number of home equity lenders began to
securitize their loans as “AAA” MBS.150 The net result of all of this growth is that “by
the end of 2002 more than 58 percent of outstanding U.S. single-family residential
mortgage debt was financed through securitization.”151
One cannot fully understand the RMBS market without understanding the role of
the GSEs in creating, stabilizing and growing that market. And so, I now turn to them.
C.

The Ongoing Role of the GSEs in the Secondary Market

Fannie and Freddie participate in the secondary market in two ways: (1) by
issuing and guarantying RMBS and (2) by purchasing mortgages and RMBS for their
own account.152 Indeed, they are monstrously large, together having $1.81 trillion in
assets and $1.76 trillion in liabilities at the end of 2003.153 The GSEs, as the dominant
purchasers of residential mortgages, have effectively standardized prime residential
mortgages by promulgating buying guidelines.154 Such standardization has led to
increases in the liquidity and attractiveness of mortgages as investments to a broad array
of investors.155 And the GSEs themselves have seen their purchases of residential
147. Id.
148. A Collateralized Mortgage Obligation is “a pay-through bond that directs the total payment of principal
and interest of the collateral pool to structure different types and maturities of securities in order to meet
investor requirements and reduce overall borrowing costs.” LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 3.12.
149. See LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at § 2.22. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 allowed CMOs to elect the
favored tax status of a REMIC and since 1986, “most new CMOs have been issued in REMIC form to create
tax and accounting advantages for the issuers.” THE BOND MARKET ASSOCIATION, THE INVESTORS GUIDE TO
PASS-THROUGH AND COLLATERALIZED MORTGAGE SECURITIES 3 (2002).
150. See Gangwani, supra note 41,at 35.
151. Consumer Protection, supra note 38, at 72;see Lore & Cowan, supra note 7, at § 1.2 (listing additional
factors in rapid growth of mortgage securitization).
152. See Fannie Mae Website, at http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/industry/index.jhtml (describing
business lines); Freddie Mac Website, at
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/about/what_we_do/business.html (same).
153. Carnell, supra note 6, at 13. As of that date, they also guaranteed $1.64 trillion in outstanding MBS. Id.
154. See id. Fannie and Freddie have also increased the safety of RMBS investments by offering credit
guaranties, “which involves guaranteeing the credit performance of single-family and multifamily loans for a
fee.” Fannie Mae Website (mortgage backed securities), at
http://www.fanniemae.com/mbs/understanding/index.jhtml).
155. See Raymond A. Jensen, Mortgage Standardization: History of Interaction of Economics, Consumerism
and Governmental Pressure, 7 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 397 (1972) (noting that Fannie Mae created task
force to identify “substantive mortgage clauses which would be essential to make the [uniform form of]
mortgage saleable to investors.”).
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mortgages rise dramatically from $69 billion in 1980.156 By 2003, Fannie and Freddie
issued $1.91 trillion of RMBS and their total outstanding RMBS amounted to $3.01
trillion.157 The net result of this growth is that the GSEs’ combined share of total bond
market debt was 36% in 2003.158
The GSEs’ charters restrict the mortgages they may buy.159 In general, they
must buy loans with loan-to-value ratios of 80 percent or less160 and may not buy
mortgages with principal amounts greater than an amount set each year and fixed at
$359,650 for a single family home for 2005.161 Loans that comply with the restrictions
placed on Fannie and Freddie are known as “conforming” loans. Those that do not
comply with either of these restrictions are known as “nonconforming” loans.162
Fannie and Freddie are now publicly traded corporations, “but they both have
nebulous, implicit guarantees, a perception by the financial markets that the [federal]
government stands behind their debt, which allows them to borrow (or sell RMBS) at
interest rates lower than they would otherwise”163 In return for this guarantee (one not
available to any other private secondary market entity), and certain other benefits that
Fannie and Freddie are granted, they were expected to grow and stabilize the secondary
market, and it is generally agreed that they achieved these goals.164 They were also
expected to lower the cost of credit for borrowers, although there is significant dispute as
to how much they have achieved this goal.165

156. See Van Order, supra note 31,at 237; Wayne Passmore et al., GSEs, Mortgage Rates, and the Long-Run
Effects of Mortgage Securitization 1 n.2 (FEDS Working Paper No. 2001-26, 2001), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=275008 (“During the 1990s, their yearly securitization rate is estimated to have
fluctuated between 45 percent and 78 percent of conventional conforming mortgage originations.”).
157. Carnell, supra note 6, at 14.
158. Id. at 15.
159. Passmore, supra note 156, at 3.
160.Id. This limitation may be lifted if other measures are taken to limit the mortgage’s credit risk. Id.
161. HOLDEN LEWIS, CONFORMING MORTGAGE LOAN LIMITS RISE FOR 2005, Bankrate.com, at
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mortgages/20041203a1.asp (Dec. 2004). The annual adjustment is
based on the annual increase in the cost of the average house, as measured by the Federal Housing Finance
Board. Id.
162. Passmore, supra note 156, at 5 (“Most private-sector securitizations are backed by jumbo mortgages or
mortgages held by “sub-prime” borrowers, the bulk of which have blemished credit histories but adequate
assets or income to support a mortgage.”); Bruskin, supra note 118, at 6-7 (identifying major categories of
nonconforming loans as jumbos, B/C quality (which includes subprime and low-doc and no-doc loans).).
Those loans that comply with Fannie and Freddie requirements except for the restriction on loan amount are
typically referred to as “jumbo” mortgages. Passmore, supra note 156, at 5.
163. Van Order, supra note 31,at 236; see also Edward L. Toy, A Credit Intensive Approach to Analyzing
Whole Loan CMOs, in HANDBOOK, supra note 14,at 219, 219 (“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac supported
securities are also treated by many as having the equivalent of U.S. government backing.”).
164. See, e.g., Passmore, supra note 156, at 3 (Fannie and Freddie’s “objectives have been largely
achieved”).
165. Id. at 215 (“We find that GSEs generally–but not always—lower mortgage rates, particularly when the
GSEs behave competitively, because the GSEs’ implicit government backing allows them to sell securities
without the credit enhancements needed in the private sector.”).
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Over half of all residential mortgages are sold into the secondary market.166 Of
those sold into the secondary market, Fannie and Freddie now own or securitize more
than 80 percent of the outstanding stock of single-family mortgages.167 The remaining
20 percent of the secondary market (other than the portion originated by Ginne Mae)
comes from the “private label” firms, a large component of which is composed of jumbo
mortgage securitizations.168
Private label firms are not in a position to compete head on with the GSEs
because their cost of capital is greater.169 Because of this advantage, Fannie and Freddie
can price their securities more attractively than private label issuers and they therefore
have nearly the entire “conforming” market to themselves.170 The fact that private-label
firms cannot compete with the GSEs is of key importance in the subprime market,
because Fannie and Freddie are beginning to enter it.171
Freddie Mac began purchasing subprime loans in 1997 and Fannie Mae began in
1999. Both have moved slowly and have limited their purchases to the most creditworthy
segment of the subprime market. They are believed to own a relatively small portion of
outstanding subprime securities.172 Nonetheless, the GSEs have had and will have an
extraordinary impact on the subprime secondary market as they become more
comfortable operating in the subprime market.
166. See Van Order, supra note 31,at 237.
167. See Roll, supra note 102, at 32 (“Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have supplied a large part of the growth
in demand for mortgage debt via two distinct channels. First, their traditional securitization activity increased
in relative importance from 1990 through 1993 and now accounts for roughly 25% of all mortgage debt.
Second, their retained portfolios of directly purchased whole loans and MBSs rose steadily during the past
decade from about 5% to more than 16% of total mortgage debt.”).
168. See Van Order, supra note 31, at 237; see NATIONALIZING MORTGAGE RISK, supra note 125, at 7-8
(according to the Federal Reserve, FHA and VA loans constitute about 11 percent of the total residential
mortgage market; commentators believe that jumbos make up another 15; Fannie and Freddie can compete
for the remainder of the market, which includes conventional/conforming loans (the majority of the
remainder) as well as subprime, home equity and multifamily housing loans).
169. Forte, supra note 90, at 4-6; see WALLISON, supra note 125, at 1 (“The lower interest rates that Fannie
and Freddie can command because of their government backing permit them to out-compete any privatesector rival and to dominate any market they are permitted to enter.”). Fannie and Freddie have a number of
other competitive advantages over other RMBS issuers. See Passmore, supra note 156, at 215, 4; Carnell,
supra note 6, at 17-19.
170. See STANDARD & POOR’S, PRICING AND PREPAYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF NONCONFORMING MORTGAGE
POOLS 1 (Aug. 14, 2000). The nonconforming rate is usually 25 to 50 basis points higher than the
conforming rate. Id.
171. See Van Order, supra note 31,at 236-37; WALLISON, supra note 125, at 7-8 (“In the past, the GSEs
purchased almost exclusively conventional/conforming loans, because those are the best credits available in
the middle-class market. But increasingly in recent years – as they have foreseen that their need for assets
will outstrip the conventional/conforming market – the GSEs have entered the market for subprime, home
equity, and multifamily housing loans.”).
172. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 73. Fannie Mae “introduced a new and improved automated
underwriting system in 1995 and began to accept higher risk loans. Subsequently, Fannie Mae began to vary
the some of the terms with the loan’s level of risk.” Wendy Edelberg, Risk-based Pricing of Interest Rates in
Household Loan Markets, at 3 (FEDS Working Paper No. 2003-62, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=484522 (citation omitted).
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Fannie and Freddie have issued buying guidelines, indicating the types of
subprime loans that they are willing to purchase. Given their dominant role in the
secondary market, their buying guidelines will likely affect the terms of the mortgages
offered by many originators, so as to ensure that Fannie and Freddie are potential buyers
of those mortgages. What is most striking about the GSEs’ guidelines is that they are
much more lenient than those that are found in the Privileged Raters pronouncements
described below.
The only general category of mortgages regulated by state predatory lending laws
that Fannie and Freddie indicated that they would not purchase are “high-cost home
loans.”173 As we shall see below, the Privileged Raters, which have far more power than
the GSEs to impact the entire subprime market, took a far more conservative approach to
loans regulated by state predatory lending laws.
IV.

THE ROLE OF RATING AGENCIES IN THE SECURITIZATION OF
MORTGAGED-BACKED SECURITIES

All rating agencies derive their power in the secondary market from the value
that investors place on the informational content of the ratings that they provide.174
Nearly every securitization of mortgage-backed securities is rated by one, and often two,
of the three dominant rating agencies, Standard & Poors, Moody’s and Fitch.175 The
173. Fannie Mae, Announcement 04-06: Authoritative Online Selling and Servicing Guides, Purchase of
Massachusetts “High Cost Home Mortgage Loans,” Mortgage Loan Documents, Arbitration, Waiver of
Prepayment Premium, Guaranty Fees, and Escrow Accounts, at 3 (Sept. 28, 2004), available at
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/resident/2004/fannie-04- 06.pdf [hereinafter FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 0406]; Fannie Mae, Announcement 03-12: Purchase of New Jersey and New Mexico “High-Cost Home Loans,”
and Illinois “High-Risk Home Loans”(Nov. 21, 2003), available at http://mbaa.org/resident/2003/fannie0312.pdf [hereinafter FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 03-12]; Fannie Mae, Announcement 03-02: Purchase of Georgia
and New York “High-Cost Home Loans” (2003), available at
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/resident/2003/fannie03-02.pdf [hereinafter FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 03-02];
Letter from Michael C. May, Senior Vice President, Freddie Mac, to All Freddie Mac Sellers and Services,
Revisions to Freddie Mac’s Purchase Requirements Based on the Enactment of Antipredatory Lending
Legislation in New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Illinois, Maine and Nevada (Nov. 26, 2003), available
at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/resident/2003/ freddie_indyltr1126.pdf [hereinafter MICHAEL MAY
LETTER]. Fannie also indicated that it would not purchase HOEPA “high-cost” home loans and loans with
mandatory arbitration clauses. FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 04-06, at 3-4. Freddie Mac indicated that it would
not buy “Mortgages originated with single-premium credit insurance; Mortgages with terms that exceed
either the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) or the points and fees threshold under the Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act HOEPA); or subprime Mortgages with prepayment terms that exceed three years.”
MICHAEL MAY LETTER.
174. Many commentators see this rating agency role as the dominant one. See Partnoy, supra note 29,at
633-34 n.62 (cataloging articles arguing that ratings have informational content). Such articles ignore or
discount the obvious privileged regulatory status of the NRSROs as well as the consistent finance literature
that argues that “credit ratings are of scant informational value.” Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit
Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 65 (Richard M. Levich et al.
eds., 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=285162.
175. See GLENNIE, supra note 93 at 221; G. Rodney Thompson and Peter Vaz, Dual Bond Ratings: A Test of
the Certification Function of Rating Agencies, 25 FIN. REV. 457 (1990) (suggesting that typically two ratings
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rating that the agency provides “is an assessment of the likelihood of timely payment on
securities.”176 The function of the rating agencies is to reduce “the information
asymmetry between issuers of and investors in securities.”177
The three dominant rating agencies (collectively, the “Privileged Raters”), derive
additional power because they are granted a privileged status by the Securities and
Exchange Commission and other financial services regulators. This privileged status
results from the incorporation of the Privileged Raters’ ratings into government
regulation of other companies. For their labors, the Privileged Raters are compensated by
fees from issuers of securities that solicit ratings from them.178
While regulators have incorporated the ratings of the Privileged Raters into their
regulations, the Privileged Raters themselves are not regulated in any meaningful way.
Thus, to the extent that they make systemic mistakes or demonstrate systemic biases, they
are not accountable to anyone – unless their failings are significant enough to threaten
investor confidence in their work product.
A. How Rating Agencies Rate
The rating process is typically initiated by or on behalf of a securities issuer.179
The issuer then provides the rating agency with information regarding the issuer’s
background, strategy, operations systems, historical performance data and any other
information that may be relevant.180 The issuer then typically meets with the rating
agency to explain the proposed structure of the deal, the nature of the underlying assets
and the operations of the originator of the assets.181
significantly decrease the yield of a security, thereby increasing issuer’s return); RICHARD CANTOR AND
FRANK PACKER, MULTIPLE RATINGS AND CREDIT STANDARDS: DIFFERENCES OF OPINION IN THE CREDIT
RATING INDUSTRY, at 13 (FRBNY Research Paper No. 9527, 1995) (arguing that additional ratings “are likely
to be most desirable when the degree of uncertainty about a firm’s prospects is large and when the amount of
funds to be raised” is substantial).
176. Schwarcz, supra note 29,at 2.
177. Id.; see Partnoy, supra note 29,at 632 (“Information asymmetry exists in markets where sellers have
superior information to buyers about product quality, yet cannot costlessly convey this information to buyers.
If buyers are economically rational, prices in a market with information asymmetry will reflect the average
quality of a product, and sellers with superior products will bear the cost of the information asymmetry.
Consequently, sellers in such a market will have an incentive to disclose the superior nature of their product
so that they can receive the highest price.”).
178. See infra note 207 and accompanying text; STIMPSON, supra note 14, at 52. For example, the SEC relies
heavily upon the services of NRSROs in Rule 3a-7, relating to the 1940 Investment Company Act. See Amy
K. Rhodes, The Role of the SEC in the Regulation of the Rating Agencies: Well-Placed Reliance or FreeMarket Interference?, 20 Seton Hall Legis. J. 293, 344 (1996). Pursuant to Rule 3a-7, “a favorable rating by
only one NRSRO of an asset-backed securities issuance exempts the transaction from the regulatory scheme
of” that Act. Id. It is in this manner that the NRSRO rating reduces the transaction costs and provides other
benefits to issuers of RMBS while also providing a benefit to the NRSRO itself because of the fees that it can
charge to the issuer for the rating analysis prescribed by Rule 3a-7.
179. See BOROD, supra note 32,at § 9.01.B.
180. Id.
181. Id. While RMBS securities issuers typically solicit a rating, it is also standard practice for Moody’s and
S&P to rate a security even where an issuer has not solicited (and paid for) a rating. Such ratings are based
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In order to evaluate the “loss potential” of nonagency (nonagency RMBS are
those that are not issued by GSEs nor by government agencies, like Ginnie Mae and are
also referred to as private label RMBS)182 mortgage pools, rating agencies need to
evaluate four key aspects of a securitization transaction:
(1) frequency of default;
(2) severity of loss given default;
(3) pool characteristics; and
(4) credit enhancement and the structure of the security.183
In order to understand these four key aspects of the transaction, rating agencies
conduct four types of analyses: (1) qualitative; (2) quantitative; (3) servicing; and (4)
legal risk.184
Qualitative Analysis. Qualitative analysis “involves a review of those items that
could result in a delay or failure of payment to the investors.”185 A primary concern here
is the risk profile of the originator.186 The rating agency will also review the assets to be
contributed into the collateral pool supporting the securities to be issued to determine,
among other things, the predictability of their cash flow.187 For real property
transactions, rating agencies review
a host of issues relating to the underlying property including, for example, the
location and accessibility of the property, the diversity and number of tenants of the
property, local and regional vacancy rates and rents, the property’s physical
condition, the property’s management, the terms of the leases of the property’s
tenants, the credit ratings of the property’s principal tenants, the strength of the local
economy, and possible hazards (such as earthquakes), among other things.188
Quantitative Analysis. Quantitative analysis involves a review of the cash flow
aspects of the transaction.189 This quantitative analysis is a key part of valuating the
collateral and determining the credit enhancement levels; it also is key to determining

solely on public information. Alexander W. Butler, and Kimberly J. Rodgers, RELATIONSHIP RATING: HOW
DO BOND RATING AGENCIES PROCESS INFORMATION?, at 16 n.17 (EFA 2003 Annual Conference Paper No.
491, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=345860 (reviewing Moody’s unsolicited ratings practices).
182. Sources of Funds, supra note 30, at 143.
183. Douglas L. Bendt, et al., The Rating Agencies’ Approach, in HANDBOOK, supra note 14,at 191, 192; see
Plank, supra note 93, at 1667n.42 (“For example, if securities backed by a pool of receivables need loss
coverage or credit enhancement equal to seven percent of the original principal balance of the receivables to
achieve the desired rating, this loss coverage could be in the form of additional collateral: An issuance of $
100 million of debt securities backed by a pool of $ 107 million receivables”).
184. BOROD, supra note 32, at § 9.01.C.
185. Id. at § 9.01.C.1.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at § 9.01.C.2.
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the sizing of the principal amount of the securities to be issued and determining whether
the issued securities will be able to make timely payment of the rated securities.190
Underwriting Criteria and Servicer Characteristics. Rating agencies review the
originators’ underwriting criteria as well as the capabilities of the servicers of the loans
that are placed within the pool.191 Rating agencies will review individual loans to ensure
that they comply with the originators stated underwriting criteria.192 The rating agency
will do an independent review of the servicer where the originator is not acting as
servicer; this is undertaken to evaluate the risk of delays in payments due to operational
problems of the servicer or its own credit problems.193
Legal Analysis. Legal analysis involves a review of the legal risks associated
with the proposed transaction.194 These legal risks, also called “litigation risks,” include
the risk that RMBS investors will be liable for violations of predatory lending laws by the
originators of the mortgages in any given RMBS pool.195 Other legal risks evaluated by
the rating agencies include
•
•
•

the effects of a bankruptcy of the issuer on the structure and cash
flows;196
the regulatory issues of the issuer/industry;
the legal structure of the sale (i.e., true sale or a loan);

190. Id.; STIMPSON, supra note 14,at 470 (“Accounting for the potential variability of collateral losses is
important in the structured finance rating process because more variable pool losses, with constant expected
pool losses, generally implies higher expected losses for investors.”).
191. BOROD, supra note 32, at § 9.01.C.4.; Schorin, supra note 75, at 83(“Loan servicers who have extensive
experience with A borrowers have found that their expertise in that arena does not necessarily, or even
generally, carry over into the B and C sector. The cost of servicing B and C loans could easily double that of
servicing A loans.”).
192. Id. at § 9.01.C.4.
193. Id. at § 9.01.C.4.; Bruskin, supra note 118, at 29 (“Many of the servicer’s functions are critical to the
credit quality of a transaction. In addition to collecting the monthly payments and passing the cash flows to
the trustee, the servicer handles delinquent loans, initiates foreclosure procedures, and liquidates properties
when necessary.”).
194. BOROD, supra note 32, at § 9.01.C.3.
195. See Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 28, at 723 (“Litigation risk is the possibility that borrowers
will bring predatory lending claims or, when charged with nonpayment, raise predatory lending defenses
against the trusts that own their loans.”); LORE & COWAN, supra note 12, at § 9.6 (“Another legal
consideration that can be expected to affect the rating of a mortgage-backed security relates to what legal
remedies and procedural rules are available to the issuer under state and local laws to enforce mortgage loan
covenants, particularly upon default in payment of principal and interest of the mortgages. Usury statutes
may operate to limit enforcement of interest rate provisions of mortgage loans in default; foreclosure laws
(such as homestead laws and statutory rights of redemption) and local procedural rules may prevent the
holder from obtaining title to property securing defaulted mortgage loans in a timely manner; and antideficiency laws effectively may preclude the possibility of timely resale of foreclosed property by the issuer.
Additional protection may be required to achieve a desired securities rating, depending upon the terms of the
collateral instruments and the jurisdictions where the mortgaged properties are located.”).
196. Historically, “[t]he main legal and regulatory considerations in structured financings are concerned with
the potential insolvency of the user of other participants in the transaction.”. STIMPSON, supra note 14, at
497.
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•

•
•

the requirements necessary for a perfection of security interests;
contractual restrictions (such as negative pledge covenants); and
the tax implications on the Special Purpose Entity and investors.197

This article will focus on the legal risk that investors in a RMBS pool will be
held liable for violations of predatory lending laws by the originators of the mortgages in
any given pool.
B. The Dominant Rating Agencies Enjoy Privileged Regulatory Status as
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
For the purposes of this article, the term “privileged regulatory status” refers to
the role of the Privileged Raters as gatekeepers to other private financial entities which
are attempting to access the financial markets.198 This status results from the favorable
treatment that government regulators grant to securities issued by private companies and
other entities that are highly rated by the Privileged Raters. This privileged regulatory
status is granted by various government bodies in exchange for the quasi-public
responsibilities the Privileged Raters take on by providing ratings to the investment
community, but is not paired with any commensurate monitoring of the Privileged Raters
themselves. Thus, the Privileged Raters themselves are privileged because regulators
have incorporated the service (ratings) that they sell into the regulatory structure of the
capital markets. In addition, the investment-grade ratings that the Privileged Raters issue
are themselves equivalent to a “regulatory license”199 thatconfers a significant financial
benefit on its recipient.200

197. See DAVID W. FORTI AND BLASÉ B. IACONELLI, SECURITIZATIONS § 19.05 (Patrick D. Dolan and C.
VanLeer Davis III, eds., 2000).
198. See Paul Robbe and Ronald J. Mahieu, Are the Standards Too Poor? An Empirical Analysis of the
Timeliness and Predictability of Credit Rating Changes 1 (Jan. 2005) (“In the United States, banks and other
financial institutions have only been allowed to hold bonds of investment grade quality (i.e., bonds that are
rated BBB- or better) ever since 1936. As a consequence, having a credit rating has become a necessity in
order to acquire external debt capital.”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=648561; Schwarcz, supra note
29, at 2 (“To a large extent, the almost universal demand by investors for ratings makes rating agencies
gatekeepers of the types of securities that investors will buy. . . . This unprecedented power, and the de facto
control of rating agencies over international debt markets, make the issue of whether rating agencies should
remain unregulated more urgent.”); Richard Cantor, Moody’s Investors Service Response to the Consultative
Paper Issued by the Basel Committee on Bank Super vision “A New Capital Adequacy Framework,” 25 J. of
BANKING AND FIN. 171, 179 (2001) (“By using ratings as a tool of regulation, regulators fundamentally
change the nature of the rating agency product. Issuers pay rating fees, not to facilitate access to the capital
market, but to purchase a privileged status for their securities from the regulator. As a result, licensed rating
agencies will have a product to sell regardless of the analytic quality of their ratings and their credibility with
the investor community.”).
199. Frank Partnoy uses the term “regulatory license” to describe “the valuable property rights associated
with the ability of a private entity, rather than a regulator, to determine the substantive effect of legal rules.”
See Partnoy, supra note 29,at 623.
200. Id.
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Rating agencies have been actively rating securities in the United States since the
beginning of the Twentieth Century.201 The main source of the privileged regulatory
status of the Privileged Raters, that select subset of rating agencies, derives from the
Securities and Exchange Commission, which had granted them (or their predecessors-ininterest) nationally recognized statistical rating organization status (each, a “NRSRO”) in
1975.202 NRSRO status initially referred to those rating agencies whose ratings could be
used in implementing the net capital requirements for broker-dealers, the first instance of
a high rating by a rating agency resulting in favorable regulatory treatment.203 At that
time, the SEC essentially grandfathered three rating agencies: Fitch, Moody’s and
Standard & Poor’s.204
Currently, a credit rating agency must request a no-action letter (the means by
which the SEC makes a case-by-case regulatory determination) from the SEC before that
agency attains NRSRO status, presumably until that agency ceases to exist.205 While six
such no-action letters have been granted by the SEC since 1975, due to consolidation
only five NRSROs remain: A.M. Best Company, Inc. (“A.M. Best”), Dominion Bond
Rating Service Limited (“DBRS”), Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P.206 The first two are very
small and have only a tiny impact on the RMBS market.207
The SEC did not define an NRSRO in 1975 and has intermittently attempted to
do so since then. The lead-up to the current rule proposal to define the term NRSRO
began in 1994 when the SEC issued a Concept Release requesting comments on the
Commission’s use of NRSRO ratings.208 The Concept Release was followed by a 1997
201 See Rhodes, supra note 178, at 294-302 (discussing the growth of rating agencies in the United States).
202. Hill, supra note 29,at 44; see Schwarcz, supra note 29,at 2 (noting, for instance, that Rule 3a-7 of the
Investment Company Act of 194 Rule 3a-7 “exempts certain financings from registration and compliance
with that Act if, among other requirements, the securities are rated ‘investment grade’ by at least one
NRSRO.”).
203 Id. at 321.
204 Id.
205 See id. at 8-10.
206 See id. at 5. See also letter from Kent Wideman, Group Managing Director, Financial Institutions &
Policy, Dominion Bond Rating Service to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, 1 (June 10, 2005) (hereinafter
DBRS Letter), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/dbrs061005.pdf (last visited August 12, 2005),
letter from Larry G. Mayewski, Executive Vice President and Chief Rating Officer, A.M. Best Company, Inc.
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, 1-2 (June 9, 2005), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/ambestco060905.pdf (last visited August 14, 2005).
207. Dominion Bond Rating Service Limited was recently granted NRSRO status on February 23, 2003. Id.
A.M. Best specializes in ratings of insurance-related organizations. See A. M. Best Website, available at
http://www3.ambest.com/ratings/default.asp (last visited August 14, 2005). The Egan-Jones Jones Rating
Company has been the most forceful of the currently non-NRSRO rating agencies in pressing the SEC to
grant it NRSRO status, but has not prevailed as of yet. See Press Release, Egan-Jones Rating Company,
November 15, 2002 Hearing on Credit Rating Agencies, at 3 (Nov. 10, 2002).
208. For a fuller discussion of the recent attempts to define the term NRSRO and the process by which credit
rating agencies are designated NRSROs, see Proposed Definition, supra note 133, at 11-20 and SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE
OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS AS REQUIRED BY §702(B) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at
10-25 (Jan. 2003), (describing the use of NRSRO ratings in government regulations and legislation, as well
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Rule Proposal to define the term NRSRO.209 The 1997 Rule Proposal would have
established a formal application process for recognizing NRSROs en lieu of the no-action
letter process.210 The 1997 Rule Proposal continued the reliance on market-based
acceptance of a rating agency through a criteria requiring “national recognition by
predominant users of securities ratings.”211 However, the SEC did not act upon this 1997
proposal and by 2002 the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs launched
investigations into the Enron Corp. collapse that questioned why the NRSROs had
continued to rate Enron a good credit risk until only four days before the firm declared
bankruptcy.212
Additionally, in November 2002 the SEC conducted public hearings on the use
of credit rating agencies in the U.S. securities markets.213 Furthermore, in January of
2003 the SEC submitted a report required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the role
and function of rating agencies that addressed the outstanding issues from the 1997 Rule
Proposal and the 2002 hearings.214 In June 2003, the SEC issued another Concept
Release seeking comments on a number of issues related to credit rating agencies.215
Among many other issues, most commenters supported the concept of regulatory
oversight of NRSROs to determine whether an agency continues to meet the NRSRO
criteria on an ongoing basis.216 Internationally, in December 2004, the Technical
Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”)
published a “Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies” that provided a
voluntary code of conduct for rating agencies that addressed how to manage or eliminate
conflicts of interest, help prevent misuse of nonpublic information,, and how to protect
agency analytical independence.217

as by foreign jurisdictions) (hereinafter SEC Report), at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf (last visited August 12, 2005).
209. Capital Requirements for Brokers or Dealers Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No.
34-39457 (December 17, 1997), 62 FR 68018 (December 30, 1997). See SEC Report, supra note 208, at 1215.
210. See SEC Report, supra note 208, at 13.
211. See id. Other criteria included organizational structure, adequate staffing, financial resources, use of
systematic procedures to ensure credible and accurate ratings, contacts with the management of issuers, and
internal procedures to prevent misuse of nonpublic information. The rule asked for comments on prohibition
of charging issuers fees based upon the size of a transaction, whether a time period should be required for
action on an application for NRSRO designation, whether NRSROs should make their ratings publicly
available, whether objective criteria should be used for NRSRO recognition, and whether statistical models
could serve as substitutes for NRSRO credit ratings. See id. at 14-15.
212. See id. at 16-18.
213. Topics addressed included: (a) the current role and functioning of rating agencies; (b) informational flow
in the rating process; (c) concerns regarding potential conflicts of interests or abusive practices; and (d) the
regulatory treatment of rating agencies, including concerns regarding barriers to entry. See id. at 20-21.
214. SEC Report, supra note 208.
215. See Proposed Definition, supra note 133, at 17-18.
216. See id. at 19.
217. See id. at 19-20 (citing THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF IOSCO, CODE OF CONDUCT FUNDAMENTALS FOR
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (December 2004)).

9/10/ 2005

30

SUBPRIME STANDARDIZATION

In 2005, the SEC has again released a Rule Proposal to define “NRSRO.”218 In
the proposed new definition, the Commission states that “[a]n entity that meets the
proposed definition would be an NRSRO,” clearly describing a self-designating process,
absent affirmative Commission action.219 The Commission’s proposal also notes that
their staff will be available to provide no-action letters as appropriate to rating agencies
that choose to seek them.220
Public comments regarding a renewal process for NRSRO no-action letters have
varied in response to whether requiring a renewal of NRSRO status is a positive
development. Unsurprisingly, Standard & Poor’s found a renewal requirement for
existing NRSROs to be an additional, unneeded cost because of a potential agreement
between existing NRSROs and the Commission to require a detailed compliance report
on an ongoing basis.221
On the other hand, the Investment Company Institute agrees that no-action letters
should only be granted for a specified period of time, after which a renewal process or
otherwise reconsideration of the agency should be necessary in order to ensure the
NRSRO still satisfies the criteria necessary for such status.222 The Association of
Financial Professionals also supports expiration dates on no-action letters through
periodic reviews to ensure that NRSROs continue to meet the initial recognition criteria
no less than every five years.223 The Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance
Professionals support an annual affirmation by the NRSRO that they continue to meet the
definitional requirements.224
The fact that the pool of NRSROs has been capped is of great significance
because in order to be sold, residential mortgage-backed securities must have a rating
218. See id..
219. Id. at 55. See also letter from Charles S. Morrison, Money Market Group Leader, Fidelity Management
& Research Company to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (June 23, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/s70405-8.pdf (last visited August 12, 2005), letter from Amy B.R.
Lancellotta, Senior Counsel, The Investment Company Institute to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, 2-3
(June 9, 2005) (hereinafter Lancellotta Letter), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/ici060905.pdf (last visited August 12, 2005).
220. Proposed Definition, supra note 133, at 55-56. In addition, due to the possibility of “changing market
conditions,” the SEC proposal calls for the staff to include “expiration dates” in NRSRO no-action letters that
it issues. Id. at 59.
221. See letter from Kathleen A. Corbet, President, Standard & Poor’s to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC,
Annex A, at 13 (June 9, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/standardpoors060905.pdf (last visited August 12, 2005). No
additional information regarding this “Framework” is available. The Dominion Bond Rating Service (A4 at
9) states that the NRSRO designation should remain in effect unless and until it is withdrawn for cause.
DBRS Letter, supra note 206, at 9.
222. Lancellotta Letter, supra note 219, at 2-3.
223. Letter from James A. Kaitz, President and CEO, Association for Financial Professionals to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary, SEC, 6 (June 7, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/afp060705.pdf (last visited August 12, 2005).
224. Letter from Securities Law Committee, Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, 3 (June 2, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/slcscsgp060205.pdf (last visited August 12, 2005).
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from one or more of them.225 This is because financial institutions that purchase assetbacked securities require the rating to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements,
investment guidelines, covenant restrictions and/or internal policies.226 Indeed, as a
practical matter, “securitizations cannot be completed without rating agency
approval.”227
Since the SEC anointed the chosen NRSROs in 1975, federal and state financial
regulators have “found that ratings may serve a variety of uses.”228 The current
regulatory environment “requires or encourages various entities—broker-dealers, banks,
money-market funds, insurance companies, trust companies, pension funds, and many
others—to purchase financial instruments rated investment grade” by a NRSRO.229
While the NRSROs thereby bestow significant regulatory benefits upon issuers of
securities, they themselves “are not subject to substantive monitoring.”230 The
Privileged Raters have been described as operating a “regulation-induced oligopoly”.231
The Privileged Raters have been criticized for a range of wrongs that relate both
to their function as providers of information and to their privileged regulatory status.
Many of these criticisms appear warranted, although it is unclear how they can be
resolved.
The most vehement criticism is that the Privileged Raters do not provide accurate
and valuable information to the markets. The most commonly cited evidence of this is
that the Privileged Raters often disagree in their ratings.232 One rating agency critic has
noted that it is unclear “what kind of information rating agencies intend to summarize”
and whether ratings “efficiently aggregate this information.”233 At a minimum, the
225. GLENNIE, supra note 93,at 221.
226. Id.; see Partnoy, supra note 29,at 711 (“credit ratings have been incorporated into hundreds of rules,
releases, and regulations, in various substantive areas, including securities, pension, banking, real estate, and
insurance regulation.”); Rhodes, supra note 178, at 313 n.116 (cataloging statutory and regulatory references
to ratings).
227. GLENNIE, supra note 93at 221; see Kendall, supra note 103 at 2 (“Since most securitized assets are sold
with double-A or triple-A ratings from a national credit-rating agency, the rating agencies are involved in the
securitization process.”).
228. STIMPSON, supra note 14at 59; see Partnoy, supra note 29,at 74 (listing eight places in USC and
references 60 places in CFR where NRSRO status is referenced.).
229. Hill, supra note 29,at 44; see Partnoy, supra note 29,at 7 4 (charting history of increasing use of ratings
in legislation and regulation).
230. Id.
231. Butler & Rodgers, supra note 181, at 16; see William H. Beaver et al., Differential Properties in the
Ratings of Certified vs. Non-Certified Bond Rating Agencies at 8 (Sept. 2004) (“Moody’s is protected from
most competition and is practically guaranteed business by virtue of legal requirements for all public bond
issuances to be rated by an NRSRO.”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=596626.
232. Larry G. Perry, The Effect of Bond Rating Agencies on Bond Rating Models, J. OF FIN. RES. 307, 307
(Winter 1985) (noting that S&P and Moody’s disagree 58 percent of the time).
233. Gunter Loffler, An Anatomy of Rating through the Cycle, 28 J. OF BANKING & FIN. 695 (“there is plenty
of academic and anecdotal evidence which suggests that agency ratings do not fully reflect available
information.”); see Perry, supra note 232, at 307 (“One of the problems associated with predicting bond
ratings is that the rating services often disagree when assigning ratings. Since the rating is a reflection of the
risk, which affects price, rating errors can affect investors and the issuing firms.”).
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financial markets perceive S&P and Moody’s “as conservative, and comparably so, in
their ratings practices. Indeed, there is some empirical evidence that the two have become
more conservative over the years.” 234
One leading rating agency scholar argues that the Privileged Raters have
survived not
because they produce credible and accurate information. They have not
maintained good reputations based on the informational content of their credit
ratings. Instead, the credit rating agencies have thrived, profited, and become
exceedingly powerful because they have begun selling regulatory licenses, i.e.,
the right to be in compliance with regulation. Credit ratings therefore are an
excellent example of how not to privatize a regulatory function. Those who
advocate privatizing other regulatory functions should heed this warning.235
C. Ratings by the Privileged Raters Are Biased against the Public Interest
Privileged Raters claim to sell their independent judgment: in the words of a
senior Moody’s employee, “it is widely recognized that a rating agency and its analysts
should be independent – not subject to influence by interested market forces, such as
financial intermediaries, governments, or issuers themselves.”236 But it appears that
NRSRO ratings are subject to biases that are not consistent with the public interest. This
is borne out both by empirical research as well as by admissions of NRSRO employees.
A recent study (the “Beaver Study”) has demonstrated that Moody’s approach to
ratings (and suggests that all NRSRO ratings) is conservative, when compared to that of
the Egan-Jones Rating Company, a credible non-NRSRO rating company.237 The
Beaver Study argues that there is an incentive for Privileged Raters to “be more
conservative because there is greater cost to losses due to overvalued assets than foregone
gains because of undervaluation” and that this incentive results from their for quasiregulatory role.238 For the purposes of the Beaver Study, this means that NRSRO ratings
are “more stable to minimize unnecessary consequences.”239
234. Hill, supra note 29,at 44; see also Schwarcz, supra note 29,at 22 (noting that “the rating agency
system, as presently constituted, is conservatively biased against innovation.”).
235. Partnoy, supra note 29, at 711; see Dieter Kerwer, Standardising as Governance: The Case of Credit
Rating Agencies. MPI Collective Goods Preprint No. 2001/3 (March 2001) (“despite the fact that rating
agencies have become increasingly influential in global financial markets, it is very hard to hold them
accountable for their action: rating agencies almost never have to justify their decisions, let alone provide
compensation to others for the adverse consequences of their mistakes.”), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=269311.
236. Stimpson, supra note 14, at 52.
237. Beaver, supra note 231, at 5. In particular, the Beaver Study found that Egan-Jones provided more
timely and accurate information when changing ratings. Id.; see also Robbe & Mahieu supra note 198, at 28
(finding that ratings are accurate but not timely).
238. Beaver, supra note 231, at 2. The Beaver Study compared the performance of NRSROs with another
reputable non-NRSRO rating agency, Egan-Jones Rating Company, and found that Egan-Jones provided
more timely and accurate information when changing ratings. Id. The study could not conclude that the
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While the conservatism found in the Beaver Study was related to the timing and
frequency of rating changes by Moody’s, the Beaver Study offers evidence that
Privileged Raters are quasi-regulators who are mindful of the impact that their
gatekeeping function has on the capital markets and take that impact into account,
demonstrably more so than Egan-Jones, when setting their ratings policy. In other words,
Privileged Raters are not merely providers of independent information, but are also quasiregulators that are subject to institutional pressures.240
In addition to this empirically demonstrated bias, the Privileged Raters often
describe themselves as “advocates” for investors.241 Indeed, S&P has made this point
explicitly in the context of anti-predatory lending laws: “Absent clarity on these issues,
in order to best protect investors in rated securities, Standard & Poor's may adopt a
conservative interpretation of an anti-predatory lending law and may, in instances where
liability is not clearly limited, exclude mortgage loans from transactions it rates.”242
While it is unclear the extent to which Privileged Rater biases impact their
predatory lending law guidelines, it is clear that their ratings policies are not the
independent Delphic pronouncements that they represent them to be. And their treatment
of state predatory lending laws, particularly when contrasted with that of the GSEs,
shows how the Privileged Raters benefit investors at the expense of subprime borrowers.
This offers a case study of how the public interest suffers from the biases of the
Privileged Raters.
As discussed in Part VI.C. below, the Privileged Raters, whether driven by bias
or merely by their own mandate to protect investors first and foremost, have come to
control a veto over state legislators who are attempting to stop predatory lending in their
jurisdictions. This veto by unelected, unaccountable, profit-driven corporations is highly
disturbing, to say the least.

difference is attributable to a conflict of interest by the Privileged Raters. It attributed the difference to the
Privileged Raters conservative approach to ratings changes. In contrast to the Privileged Raters, Egan-Jones
charges investors, rather than issuers, for their services. Thus, they have an incentive to provide investors
with timely information. Regardless of whether the NRSROs’ bias is consciously attributable to their issuerpaid fee business model, the ratings are inaccurate consistent with their clients’ best interest and not those of
investors.
239 Id. This contrasts with the Egan-Jones ratings which is generally more timely and more responsive to
new information. Id.
240. Egan-Jones argues that one such form of institutional pressure results from the compensation structure
that Privileged Raters have developed: “[i]f rating firms are dependent on issuers for support, they will bow
to the wishes of those issuers . . ..”. Letter from Egan-Jones Ratings Company to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
SEC, 1 (May 26, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70405/eganjones052605.pdf (last
visited August 25, 2005). While there is no empirical evidence that the Privileged Raters have succumbed to
such pressure in the development of their predatory lending legislation guidelines, it is also unquestionably
true that the interests of the Privileged Raters and issuers of RMBS both benefit from less state regulation and
from a strong Holder in Due Course doctrine.
241. BOROD, supra note 32, at § 9.01.A.
242. Testimony of Frank Raiter (Managing Director, Standard & Poor's Credit Market Services) At U.S.
Congress Financial Services; Financial Institutions And Consumer Credit Subcommittee 14 (June 23, 2004)
(emphasis added).
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V.

PRIVILEGED RATERS GUT STRONG STATE PREDATORY LENDING
LEGISLATION

New Jersey recently felt compelled to amend one of its premier consumer
protection laws, the Home Ownership Security Act (the “NJ Law”), even though it was
enacted with broad partisan support in 2003.243 The NJ Law was designed to control a
small number of unscrupulous brokers and lenders that originate predatory loans.244
That same year, Georgia found itself doing the same thing -- amending its own
anti-predatory lending law, the “Fair Lending Act,” that it had enacted mere months
before. 245
These changes are cause for great concern as they were driven in large part by
the Privileged Raters which had decided, in effect, that the laws had to change. And
change they did. The Privileged Raters, which promote themselves as no more than
information-analyzing handmaidens to the invisible hand of the market, have taken it
upon themselves to prevent states from regulating in their traditional spheres of authority:
mortgage and consumer protection laws.246 As a result of these actions by the Privileged
Raters, the judgment about the suitability of such laws is becoming less and less the
domain of the duly elected representatives of state citizens; rather, it has shifted into the
domain of financial services firms that are advocates for investors, not the public.
S&P, Moody’s and Fitch each have their own approach to rating RMBS pools,
but they all pay particular attention to the impact of predatory lending statutes on such
pools. All of the Privileged Raters review such statutes in order to determine whether
they are 1) ambiguous, 2) allow for assignee liability,247 and 3) allow for unquantifiable
damages.
While the Privileged Raters differ on their approaches to assessing the risk in the
RMBS market, they eventually arrived at similar conclusions regarding anti-predatory
lending laws. The Privileged Raters rate RMBS transactions by categorizing each state
statute based upon the nature and degree of the assignee liability and damages provisions
of its anti-predatory lending law. Based on those evaluations, the Privileged Raters
decide whether the transaction can be rated and, if it can be rated, how much credit
enhancement is necessary to achieve the desired rating. In states where there is both
assignee liability and unquantifiable damages, some of the Privileged Raters have refused
to rate transactions containing mortgage loans from such jurisdictions.248 Moreover, the
Privileged Raters have determined that the legal risks in certain states (as well as in
certain municipalities that have enacted anti-predatory lending legislation) require that
243. See infra Part V.F.
244. See id.
245. See infra Part V.D.
246. See Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 28, at 716 (“The ratings agencies have interposed
themselves as the ultimate arbiters of these laws by refusing to rate subprime RMBS in jurisdictions whose
assignee liability provisions they deemed too harsh.”).
247. That is, the law allows for liability for a wrong perpetrated by the originator of a note to attach to an
assignee of the note.
248. See Parts V.D. & V.F.
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RMBS transactions either bar loans originating from such jurisdictions or, if a pool does
contain loans from such jurisdictions, implement expensive credit enhancements to
achieve the ratings desired by the securitizers of such pools.249 That is, these actions can
effectively shut down the entire mortgage market of a state that passes strong predatory
lending legislation.
A result of the Privileged Raters’ analysis has been that they have pushed states
to standardize their predatory lending laws. This standardization benefits secondary
market players because it reduces their risks and tends to increase the size of the RMBS
market by reducing transaction costs. And unlike the standardization that took place in
the prime market in the 1970s, this standardization is not implemented with the needs of
homeowners in mind. The evidence of this is clear from the discussion that follows in
this Part regarding the Georgia and New Jersey predatory lending laws. But it is also
clear that key players in the more than twenty other states that passed predatory lending
legislation watched the interplay between the Privileged Raters and these two state
governments250 and modified their own bills to comply with the standardization that the
Privileged Raters imposed in those two cases.
A.

The Home Ownership Equity Protection Act Provides Limited
Protection

In addition to state predatory lending laws, there have been many attempts to
respond to the explosion of predatory lending. State attorneys general have initiated
lawsuits.251 Regulators have taken administrative action.252 And Congress has passed
new laws.253 These efforts have had varying success, with the Holder in Due Course254
doctrine frequently standing in the way of remedies for predatory lending’s victims. This
is because the Holder in Due Course doctrine protects the ultimate funders of predatory
249. See infra Part V.F.
250. See, e.g., Diane Velasco, Others Have Tried Something Similar, ALBUQUERQUE J., January 26, 2004, at
9 (spokesman for ACORN, which was instrumental in drafting New Mexico's predatory lending legislation
stated that "During the last (legislative) session, we made sure that the [secondary market’s] problems with
the Georgia law were not duplicated in the New Mexico law so we wouldn't have the same difficulties"); see
also Jack Milligan, Learning the Hard Way, Mortgage Banking, September 1, 2004, at 26, 26 (“There are
three important lessons that can be learned from the Georgia experience, and states that have yet to pass their
own predatory lending law would do well to pay heed.”). For a thorough review of the legislation in those
other states, see Azmy, supra note 66, at 361-78; see also Giang Ho and Anthony N. Pennington-Cross, The
Impact of Local Predatory Lending Laws (FRB St. Louis Working Paper No. 2005-049A, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=761106 (quantifying differences among predatory lending laws).
251. In one such settlement, coordinated by over a dozen state attorneys general, Household Finance and its
affiliates, all major mortgage lenders, agreed to pay tens of thousands of borrowers up to $484 million.
Michael Slackman, Borrowers To Share Mortgage Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2003, at B4.
252. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 23-24. (listing major regulatory enforcement actions).
253. See infra Part V.A.
254. The Holder in Due Course doctrine has been codified at U.C.C. § 3-302 (2003). Article 3 of the U.C.C.
(which contains section 3-302) has been adopted, albeit with some variations, in all fifty states as well as the
District of Columbia. Gregory E. Maggs, Determining The Rights and Liabilities of The Remitter of a
Negotiable Instrument: A Theory Applied to Some Unsettled Questions, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 619, 626 (1995).
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practices, secondary market investors who purchase mortgage notes.255 The Holder in
Due Course doctrine immunizes them, as good faith purchasers, from liability for any
fraud perpetrated by the originator of a loan.256 The net result of the application of the
doctrine is that a borrower who has been the victim of a fraud not only cannot be
compensated for the harm caused by the fraud, but even more, cannot assert the existence
of the fraud as a defense against payment on the mortgage note.257
Federal law does not provide much by way of protection for homeowners seeking
to secure a mortgage. The Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), originally enacted in
1968, requires certain important disclosures to a borrower by a lender in connection with
the origination of a home loan,258 TILA, however, has not been successful in stemming
the tide of predatory lending practices.259 The Home Ownership Equity Protection Act,
an amendment to TILA, enacted in 1994, went beyond disclosure requirements and
placed direct limits on certain practices if made in connection with “high cost loans.”260
HOEPA’s protections are triggered by either a (i) “rate trigger” or an “APR trigger,”
where the Annual Percentage Rate (“APR”) of the loan exceeds by 8% the yield on
Treasury securities of comparable maturity261 for first lien loans (or above 10% for
subordinate lien loans); or (ii) the “fee-trigger,” where the total of the loan’s points and
fees exceeds 8% of the loan total or $400 (adjusted for inflation), whichever is greater.262
HOEPA prohibits the inclusion of certain loan terms in high cost loans that are
considered abusive: negative amortization;263 balloon payments where a loan has a term
of less than five years;264 increases in the interest rate in the event of a default;265 and, in
certain cases, prepayment penalties.266 Moreover, a lender originating a HOEPA loan
cannot engage in a pattern and practice of asset-based lending, that is, lending without
regard to a borrower’s ability to pay.267 The Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation Z,
which implements HOEPA, also places limits on loan flipping: lenders and their affiliates
255. Eggert, Held Up, supra note 28,at 511 -13 (describing link between securitization in subprime market
and predatory lending).
256. See generally id. (discussing impact of Holder in Due Course Doctrine on subprime market).
257. See generally id.
258. 15 U.S.C. § 1638 (2000).
259. Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit: The Historical
Context of the Truth In Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 898 (2003).
260. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
261. That is, if a loan had a fifteen year term, the relevant comparable Treasury would be one with a fifteen
year term as well.
262. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1), (3) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i) (2004).
263. 15 U.S.C. § 1539(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(2). “Negative amortization” refers to loans for which the
principal amount of the loan increases (rather than decreases as with the typical loan) over the term of the
loan. See JOINT HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 53, at 91.
264. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(e); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c)(3), (d)(1) (Official Staff Commentary). For loan terms that
exceed five years, balloon payments are permissible, but must be disclosed. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c)(3).
265. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(d); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(4).
266. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)(1)(A); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(6).
267. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h). HOEPA defines this conduct as extending credit “based on the consumer’s
collateral without regard to the consumers’ repayment ability, including the consumers’ current and expected
income, current obligations, and employment.” Id.
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cannot refinance a HOEPA loan within a year unless the refinance is “in the borrower’s
interest.”268
HOEPA has not materially reduced predatory lending because of two major
shortcomings. First, it does not apply to purchase money mortgages (those used to
purchase homes) or open-end lines of credit (such as home equity lines of credit).269
Second, it only covers a small portion of the mortgage market because its triggers are set
very high.270 Thus many states have enacted their own predatory lending laws to
compensate for these and other shortcomings in the federal response to predatory
lending.271
In the last few sessions, Congress has considered a predatory lending bill first
introduced by Representative Robert Ney (R-OH) and now co-sponsored by
Representative Paul Kanjorski (D-PA) that seeks to preempt state predatory lending laws
and enact a uniform federal law in their place.272 This bill contains consumer protections
that are considerably weaker than those found in the leading state laws, and is seen as a
pro-industry initiative.273 As I argue in Part VI.A., it is premature to replace these state

268. 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(3) (2004). In considering whether a refinancing is in the borrower’s interest,
Regulation Z instructs lenders to consider the totality of the borrower’s circumstances at the time the credit
was extended. Id. (Official Staff Commentary).
269. Open-end credit is a credit extension where the exact amount of money lent or advanced at any given
time is not fixed. Id. § 1602(i). It is, in short, a line of credit. Open-end lines of credit are replacing
traditional home equity loans in part to avoid HOEPA regulation. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TRUTH IN
LENDING § 9.2.4.3 (4th ed., 1999).
270. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 5. (“it appears that HOEPA covers only a limited portion of
all subprime loans.”). Notwithstanding HOEPA’s abrogation of the Holder in Due Course Doctrine,
Moody’s has rated transactions that contain loans that trigger HOEPA. See, e.g., MOODY’S INVESTOR
SERVICE, MOODY’S EXPANDS CONSIDERATION OF ASSIGNEE LIABILITY RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES IN
SECURITIZATIONS (Jan. 30, 2003) (indicating that Moody’s has rated pools containing HOEPA loans),
available at http://www.moodys.com/. S&P, on the other hand, does not rate HOEPA loans. Standard &
Poor's. S&P Comments on High-Cost Residential Mortgage Loans (August 16 2001) available at
http://www.rebuz.com/research/0801-real-estate-research/standard-&-poors.htm. Additional federal statutes
provide other grounds for liability for predatory practices. Lenders may be liable for violations of the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (2000), by engaging in kickback schemes. 12
U.S.C. § 2607 (2000). Certain predatory practices that are targeted based on age, race, national origin,
gender, or other prohibited characteristics can also result in violations of Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1691 et seq. (2000), or the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (2000). Finally, “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices” by predatory lenders may expose them to liability under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. (2000). See generally, OCC, Avoiding Predatory and Abusive
Lending Practices in Brokered and Purchased Loans at 4 (OCC Advisory Letter, February 21, 2003).
271. See supra note 250.
272. Legislative Update, American Banker at 5 (June 9, 2005); Legislative Update, American Banker at 5
(June 9, 2005); see RESPONSIBLE LENDING ACT, 109TH CONG, 1ST SESS., H.R. 1295 (Ney/Kanjorski bill).
273. See Azmy, supra note 66, at 389 (arguing that the Ney bill “fails to address many predatory lending
practices that states regulat[e], including balloon payments, negative amortization loans, loan flipping, asset
based lending, and others. . . . Not surprisingly, the lending industry supports preemption efforts in general
and the Ney bill in particular . . ..”).

9/10/ 2005

38

SUBPRIME STANDARDIZATION

efforts to address a new, complex and rapidly evolving problem with an untested uniform
federal standard.274
B.

North Carolina Enacts a Predatory Lending Law That Builds
Incrementally on Federal Law

North Carolina enacted the first state predatory lending law on July 22, 1999,
effective July 21, 2000 (the “NC Law”). The NC Law is closely modeled on the federal
Home Owner Equity Protection Act.275 It also builds upon protections in North
Carolina’s usury statute276 by prohibiting specific types of loan provisions and lending
practices for two categories of loans: “consumer home loans”277 (“NC Home Loans”)
and “high cost home loans” (“NC High Cost Home Loans”).278 A recent empirical study
(the Quercia Study) has found that the NC Law operates as designed: predatory loan
terms were reduced without materially reducing the supply of subprime credit to lowincome borrowers.279

274. Id. (“Forestalling preemption of these important state laws will assist federal and other state regulators to
better understand and address the predatory lending problem.”).
275. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(2000) .
276. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24- 2 (West 2004).
277. Id. at § 24-10.2(a) (defining "consumer home loans" to include all mortgage loans that are made to
natural persons, primarily for personal, family and household purposes; and are loans secured by liens on
one-to-four family residences that are or will become the borrower's principal dwelling.”); and id. at § 2410.2(a). Prohibited practices for NC Home Loans include financing (directly or indirectly) any credit life,
disability, or unemployment insurance, or any other life health insurance premium; and flipping. Id.
278. Id. at § 24-1.1E(a)(4) (defining “high cost home loans” to include loans, other than open-end credit
plans and reverse mortgage loans, (i) for which the principal amount of the loan does not exceed the lesser of
the Fannie Mae conforming loan size limit for a single-family dwelling or $300,000; (ii) made to a natural
person; (iii) incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes; (iv) secured by either a security
interest in a manufactured home or a mortgage or deed of trust on real property upon which is located a
structure designed principally for occupancy by one-to-four families, either of which is or will be occupied
by the borrower as his or her principal dwelling; and (v) meeting one or more of the "thresholds" included in
the act. The statute prohibits the following provisions in NC High Cost Home Loans: call provisions,
balloon payments, negative amortizations, default interest rates, advance payments, and modification or
deferral fees. Id. at § 24-1.1E. Certain lending practices are also prohibited for NC High Cost Home Loans,
including: lending without regard to ability to repay, financing points and fees, charging refinancing fees with
the same lender, and the direct payment of home improvement contractors. Id. Additionally, all NC High
Cost Home Loan borrowers must receive home ownership counseling. Id.
279. Roberto G. Quercia et al., The Impact of North Carolina's Anti-Predatory Lending Law: A Descriptive
Assessment 1 (2003), available at http://www.kenan- flagler.unc.edu/assets/documents/CC NC Anti
Predatory Law Impact.pdf. An earlier study had concluded that the NC Law reduced the supply of credit to
low-income borrowers, but the Quercia Study appears to have been better designed and to have relied on
superior data. See Azmy, supra note 66, at 380-81(criticizing study by Gregory Elliehausen & Michael
Staten, Regulation of Subprime Mortgage Products: An Analysis of North Carolina's Predatory Lending Law
14-15 (Credit Research Ctr., Georgetown Univ., Working Paper No. 66, 2002), available at
http://www.msb.edu/prog/crc/pdf/ RevisedWP66.pdf.).
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A review of the NC Law reveals that it 1) clearly delineates between these two
categories of loans, 2) does not provide for assignee liability,280 and 3) limits damages
such that they are a quantifiable liability.281 These three aspects of the NC Law are of
primary concern for the Privileged Raters as they rate RMBS transactions containing
North Carolina loans.
C.

The Privileged Raters Initially Underestimate the Impact of State
Predatory Lending Legislation

As discussed above, when rating mortgage pools, Privileged Raters typically
undertake four distinct analyses: qualitative; quantitative; underwriter and servicer
characteristics; and legal risks.282 The Privileged Raters have significantly adjusted their
legal risks analysis of RMBS transactions to account for the new predatory lending laws.
On April 28, 2000, Moody’s became the first Privileged Rater to publicly address
the phenomenon of predatory lending, nine months after North Carolina passed its law
and three months before that law was to take effect. Moody’s initially concluded that
allegations of predatory lending practices by mortgage originators would not affect most
subprime securitizations, regardless of litigation outcomes, since the transactions are
monoline-insured,283 meaning that the company that has insured a pool of given
mortgages would bear the risk of adverse litigation outcomes.284 Moody’s also
suggested that a senior-subordinated securitization structure285 would limit potential
280. But see Press Release, Standard & Poors, Standard & Poor’s Addresses North Carolina Anti-Predatory
Lending Law (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://www.mbaa.org/state_update/index.cfm (arguing that, under
North Carolina case law, mortgage holders may have assignee liability); see also OVERTON V. TARKINGTON,
249 N.C. 340 (1959) (holding that defendant had right to assert usurious interest payments as affirmative
defense against assignee of mortgage).
281. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-2 (West 2004) (usury statute permits damages of twice the amount of
interest paid in action in nature of action for debt); id. at § 75-1.1 (unfair and deceptive practices act
authorizes treble damages and attorney’s fees); § 24-10.2(e) (“Any person seeking damages or penalties
under the provisions of this section may recover damages under either this Chapter or Chapter 75, but not
both.”). Since the damages are not applied cumulatively and are statutorily defined they are a quantifiable
liability.
282. See supra Part IV.A.
283. A monoline insurer is an “insurance company that is restricted, by the terms of its charter, to writing
insurance policies related to a single type of risk. In a financial context, the monoline insurer unconditionally
guarantees the repayment of certain securities issued in connection with specified types of transactions,
usually a securitization . . . in return for the payments of a fee or premium.” Standard & Poor’s Structured
Finance: Glossary of Securitization Terms, at 18 (available at
http://www.securitization.net/pdf/sp_gloss_060103.pdf ).
284. MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, PREDATORY LENDING AND HOME EQUITY SECURITIZATIONS (April 28,
2000), available at http://moodys.com. [hereinafter MOODY’S PREDATORY LENDING 1/28/00] (“First, a large
number of deals are fully insured by a monoline bond insurer. In these transactions, the risk of a litigation
outcome that impairs the loans in a securitization rests solely with the insurer, not with the security holders.
Insured deals constitute 53.25% of the subprime mortgage- backed securities issued during the period from
1997 through the end of 1999.”).
285. MOODY’S PREDATORY LENDING 1/28/00, supra note 284. (“among the approximately 46.75% of
securities issued in transactions that used the senior-subordinate manner of credit enhancement, there is
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liability to issuers who (i) engage regularly in predatory lending practices, (ii) are subject
to well-publicized allegations286 and (iii) have geographically concentrated loan
pools.287 Based on this analysis, Moody’s concluded that the “the economic
consequences of predatory lending accusations for securitization investors will be
limited.”288 This conclusion was based in part upon assumptions as to the limited
remedies available to borrowers should a court find that a lender’s practices were
predatory.289 Indeed, Moody’s predicted that a borrower’s remedies would be limited to
rescission of the loan contract and/or recoupment of any damages from the loan amount
owed.290 These remedies in individual actions would not pose a significant concern to
investors.291 Given the limited remedies, sufficient bond insurance, and appropriate
structuring of a securitization, Moody’s predicted that the effect of anti-predatory lending
laws on RMBS transactions would be minimal. It appears that Moody’s underestimated
the extent to which other states would follow North Carolina’s lead and enact their own
predatory lending laws because it dramatically changed its analysis in 18 months.292
Nearly two years later, Fitch became the next Privileged Rater to address the
impact of predatory lending on the RMBS market.293 Fitch reviewed the assignee
liability sections of newly enacted predatory lending statutes and identified the legal risks
posed by certain ambiguous provisions in anti-predatory lending laws.294 Fitch found

protection in the subordination levels to withstand some unexpected litigation. At the Aaa level, in particular,
there is a cushion to protect investors from unforeseen difficulties like lawsuits. Only widespread and
concerted litigation against an issuer and its practices, that focuses on a large proportion of that originator’s
production, would be broad enough to imperil the rating of a Aaa-rated class of securities.”). Seniorsubordinated securities as a pass-through mortgage issue with two classes, with the subordinated class
absorbing the payment risks for both classes. LORE & COWAN, supra note 7, at APP. A.
286. MOODY’S, supra note 284. (“the complexity of reconstructing the past practices of challenged lenders is
likely to lead banking regulators and attorneys general to focus on modifying lenders’ future conduct to
comply with applicable laws, rather than pursuing claims relating to past acts.”).
287. Id. (“potential plaintiffs in any given loan pool are often geographically dispersed, which makes
coordinated, widespread litigation difficult. Originators benefit from this difficulty, because many borrowers
will not risk losing their homes without the safety of a large and organized effort to challenge a lender.”).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. (“Set-off or recoupment is the reduction of the loan amount owed by the borrower by the amount of
any claims for damages of the borrower against the lender. The borrower would simply reduce the amount
owed on his loan by the amount of any damage claims relating to unlawful (predatory) acts. The resulting
reduction in the loan amounts would be a loss to the subordinate securities.”).
291. Id.
292. See generally Azmy, supra note 66, at 362-78 (2005) (describing more than two dozen state and local
predatory lending laws enacted since NC Law was enacted).
293. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Ratings Comments on Recent Predatory Lending Legislation
(December 24, 2002) available at
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/sectors/rmbs_predatory_lending.cfm?sector_flag=3&marketsector=2
&detail=&body_content=pred_lend [hereinafter FITCH RATINGS COMMENTS 12/24/02].
294. Id. (referring to the “reasonable tangible net benefit” test contained in HOSA).
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that such ambiguity “may negatively impact mortgage markets and their participants.”295
Despite these risks, Fitch’s concluded, in large part based on discussion with originators,
that there were no inherent increased risks to the RMBS market posed by the newly
enacted predatory lending laws.296
Moody’s and Fitch were soon to change their relatively sanguine legal analysis of
predatory lending legislation. Moody’s came to put more weight on the statutes’ punitive
damages provisions. Fitch appeared to reduce its reliance upon statements by subprime
lenders as to their own practices and align itself with the more critical voices of the
Privileged Raters. And Standard & Poors, while last to address state predatory lending
laws, was the first to come out highly critical of their impact on RMBS investors.
D.

The Georgia Experience: Pushing Forward, Pulled Back

Georgia attempted to take a more aggressive tack than the one taken by North
Carolina. It is highly unlikely that they were aware of how the Privileged Raters would
respond. The Privileged Raters effectively shut down the Georgia mortgage market
because they found the Georgia legislation to be too much of a risk to the secondary
market because it threatened the standard application of the Holder in Due Course
Doctrine to RMBS transactions, thereby exposing investors to new forms of potential
liability. And not until Georgia amended its law to meet the Privileged Raters concerns
did the Georgia market reopen.
1. The Georgia Fair Lending Act Provides for Assignee Liability and
Unquantifiable Damages
The Georgia Fair Lending Act (the “Georgia Law”) became effective on October
1,
Below is a brief description of its provisions. Of particular relevance are the
provisions for assignee liability298 and for punitive damages.299
The Georgia Law created three categories of loans: “home loans” (“GA Home
Loans”), “covered home loans” (“GA Covered Home Loans”) and “high-cost home
2002.297

295. Id. Fitch’s opinion was based on “discussions with the majority of the subprime mortgage loan
originators who have confirmed that they do not originate or purchase high cost loans.” Id.
296. Id. (“Fitch will continue its discussions with various market participants, including originators, sellers
and servicers, to confirm its current belief that risks to transactions have not increased.”).
297. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-1: 7-6A-13 (West 2004).
298. Id. at § 7-6A-5(a) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, where a home loan was made,
arranged, or assigned by a person selling either a manufactured home or home improvements to the dwelling
of a borrower, the borrower may assert all affirmative claims and any defenses that the borrower may have
against the seller or home improvement contractor against the creditor, any assignee, holder, or servicer in
any capacity.”).
299. Id. at § 7-6A-6(a) (“Any person found by a preponderance of the evidence to have violated this chapter
shall be liable to the borrower for the following . . . (3) Punitive damages, when the violation was malicious
or reckless...”).
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loans” (“GA High-Cost Home Loans”).300 GA Home Loans, the broadest category,
covered all loans secured by mortgage, security deed, or secured debt within the Fannie
Mae conforming loan size.301 GA Covered Home Loans included all (i) first lien loans
with interest rates that are greater than four percentage points above the prime rate or two
percentage points above the comparable Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac and (ii) junior-liens
five and one half percentage points above the prime rate or three percentage points above
the comparable Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac rates, loans in which the total points and
fees, excluding bona fide discount points302, exceed three percentage points, and (iii) all
GA High-Cost Home Loans.303 GA High-Cost Home Loans were those loans that either
exceed an Annual Percentage Rate tied to the HOEPA interest rate trigger304 or a fees
trigger that is typically 5 points.305
The Georgia Law prohibited 15 specific practices for GA High-Cost Home
Loans:306 and five prohibited lending practices for all GA Home Loans, including a ban
on loan flipping.307 Loan flipping had been the most contested of these prohibitions,
since it required that all GA Covered Loans that were refinanced from an existing GA
Home Loan provide a “reasonable tangible net benefit” to the borrower.308
The Georgia Law granted remedies that may be asserted against assignees for
violations of the statute; in particular, it granted a borrower the right to assert all
affirmative claims and defenses against assignee purchasers of GA High Cost Home
Loans.309 For GA Covered Home Loans, it offered a more limited right: borrowers

300. Id. at § 7-6A-5.
301. Id. at § 7-6A-2(9).
302. Id. at § 7-6A-2 (4) (“‘Bona fide discount points’ means loan discount points knowingly paid by the
borrower for the express purpose of reducing, and which in fact do result in a bona fide reduction of, the
interest rate applicable to the home loan; provided, however, that the undiscounted interest rate for the home
loan does not exceed by more than one percentage point the required net yield for a 90 day standard
mandatory delivery commitment for a home loan with a reasonably comparable term from either the Federal
National Mortgage Association or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, whichever is greater.”)
303. Id. at § 7-6A-2(6).
304. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) (2000).
305. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A -2 (19)(B) (West 2004). The fee trigger is different for loans that are for the
principal amount of $20,000 or less; in that case, the fee trigger is the lesser of 8% or $1,000. Id.
306. Id. at § 7-6A-5. The 15 prohibited practices are prepayment penalties greater than 2% of the outstanding
balance; balloon payments; negative amortization; default interest rates; advance payments; limitations on
access to legal remedies; lending without counseling; lending without regard to borrower’s ability to repay;
direct payment to home improvement contractors; loan modification fees; foreclosure without certified
notification 14 day prior to initiating proceedings; limits on the right to cure default prior to an acceleration
clause; foreclosure without notice of the right to cure default; acceleration clauses at the lender’s sole
discretion; and, finally, making loans without disclosure of the assignee liability of the Georgia Law. Id.
307. Id. The 5 prohibited practices are the selling of single premium credit insurance; encouraging default;
imposing late penalties greater than 5%; and charging more $10 for transmitting information on the balance
due.
308. Id.
309. Id.
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could assert claims against assignees to offset the outstanding debt.310 The damages
included: actual damages, treble damages, punitive damages, and reasonable costs and
attorney’s fees, each of which may be applied cumulatively or individually.311 The
Georgia Law’s assignee liability and damages provisions caused the Privileged Raters to
rethink their positions on predatory lending legislation.
2. The Privileged Raters Exclude Georgia Loans from Their Rated
Transactions because of Concerns That Investors Will Be Liable for
Uncapped Damages
Just a few months after the Georgia Law became effective, the Privileged Raters
concluded that Georgia’s assignee liability provisions created potentially unlimited
damages for purchasers of GA High Cost Home Loans and thus pools containing them
were too risky to be rated.312 The Privileged Raters’ announcements caused turmoil
among Georgia lenders who depended heavily on their ability to sell their loans on the
secondary market; a number of these lenders indicated that they were on the verge of
abandoning residential lending in Georgia.313 S&P first addressed the Georgia Law on
January 16, 2003, stating that it would not rate transactions that contained GA Home
Loans.314
Moody’s staked out a similar position on January 30, 2003, stating that the
inclusion of GA Home Loans in securitization transactions was too risky.315 Moody’s
position marked a change of course from its original position that predatory lending laws
would not severely impact the secondary market.316 Fitch also retreated from its original
position on predatory lending legislation on February 5, 2003, stating that it would not
rate transactions with uncapped assignee liability, disallowing the Georgia Law loans
from its rated transactions.317 By refusing to rate transactions containing Georgia Home

310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Press Release, Standard and Poor’s, Standard and Poor’s To Disallow Georgia Fair Lending Act Loans
(Jan. 16, 2003), available athttp://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html [hereinafter S&P DISALLOWS
GA 1/16/03]; MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, MOODY’S EXPANDS CONSIDERATION OF ASSIGNEE LIABILITY
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES IN SECURITIZATIONS (Jan. 30, 2003) available at http://www.moodys.com/
[hereinafter MOODY’S EXPANDS CONSIDERATION 1/30/03]; Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Ratings
Declines To Rate Georgia Loans In RMBS Pools Considers Impact To Other Predatory Lending Legislation
(Feb. 5, 2003) available at http://www.fitchratings.com/ [hereinafter FITCH DECLINES GA 2/5/03]
313. See GA. BANKER’S ASS’N, GAFLA: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 2 (2003), available at
http://www.gabankers.com/issuespredatorylendingwhitepaper.pdf (Jan. 2003).
314. S&P DISALLOWS GA 1/16/03, supra note 312. (“S&P stated it would rate mortgages on properties in
Georgia not governed by the Georgia Law; most notably those outside the conforming Fannie Mae balance [.
. .], reverse mortgages, and bridge loans). Id.
315. MOODY’S EXPANDS CONSIDERATION 1/30/03, supra note 312.
316. See supra text accompanying note 284.
317. FITCH DECLINES GA 2/5/03, supra note 312. (“Fitch has concluded that it will not rate transactions with
uncapped assignee liability as detailed in the current Georgia Fair Lending Act (GFLA), as it stands today”).

9/10/ 2005

44

SUBPRIME STANDARDIZATION

Loans and thereby blocking access to the secondary market, the Privileged Raters forced
the Georgia legislature to reevaluate and amend the Georgia Law.
While S&P was concerned to some extent with ambiguities in the Georgia Law,
its main concern was the assignee liability that could attach to the secondary market
parties to a securitized transaction containing Georgia Home Loans.318 Moody’s echoed
S&P’s position, stating that since there was no cap on punitive damage awards, 319 the
potential unlimited liability that might attach to assignees under the Georgia Law
prevented the inclusion of such loans in rated transactions.320 Moody’s also reversed its
position that securitizations could be structured to limit the litigation risks.321
Moody's gave direction to the legislature, stating that any Moody’s analysis of an
amended Georgia Law would focus on the risk of assignee liability.322 Moody’s was
particularly concerned with the risks associated with the accidental misclassification of
loans (that is, misclassifying a high-risk GA High Cost Home Loan as a low-risk GA
Home Loan),323 the difficulty of lender compliance with the restrictions on loans in each
category,324 and, above all else, the unlimited liability of the assignee.325
Fitch stated that it would not rate transactions with uncapped assignee
liability.326 Fitch based its position on surveys of RMBS issuers and on an analysis of 20
settled predatory lending cases.327 Fitch’s method was to examine the frequency and
severity of loss for each loan that is subject to a predatory lending statute such as the
Georgia Law to identify the risk that it poses to the RMBS transaction.328 Analysis of 20
318. S&P DISALLOWS GA 1/16/03, supra note 312. (“transaction parties in securitizations, including
depositors, issuers and servicers, might all be subject to penalties for violations under the GFLA.”); see also
Milligan, supra note 250, at 26 (“Susan Barnes, a managing director in S&P's residential mortgage group,
said the agency was concerned that originators wouldn't be able to adequately determine the threshold
between normal home, covered and high-cost loans because of some fuzziness in the language of the law. But
the law's unlimited assignee liability was S&P's ‘foremost concern,’ says Barnes.”).
319. MOODY’S EXPANDS CONSIDERATION 1/30/03, supra note 312 (“The risks are theoretically immeasurable
because there is no cap on punitive damage awards. Further, the statute extends liability to loan assignees,
which would include securitization trusts.”).
320. Id. (“The potential unlimited trust liability makes the risk posed by those Georgia loans inconsistent with
Moody's standards for rated securities.”). Like S&P, Moody’s stated it would continue to rate nonconforming Georgia loans. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. (“Because some of the criteria for categorizing loans into these tiers may be difficult to measure
(e.g., determining indirect compensation to a broker from any source), satisfactory compliance procedures for
properly categorizing each loan would prove burdensome and would unlikely be foolproof.”).
324. Id. (“the restrictions on "covered" loans include qualitative elements (i.e., providing a tangible net
benefit to the borrower) that raise burdensome compliance issues. Furthermore, the even more onerous
additional restrictions on "high-cost" loans likely present an insurmountable burden to including such loans in
a rated securitization.”).
325. Id.
326. FITCH DECLINES GA 2/5/03, supra note 312.
327. Id.
328. Id. (“The current legal issue concerning predatory lending presents unique challenges to adequately
assess the frequency and severity, and ultimately the risk, to a securitization. For example, certain legislation
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settled cases showed an average award of $76 million per case, although they were
primarily class action suits.329 Of particular interest to Fitch was a recent action for
$100,000 in compensatory damages for which the court awarded $6 million in punitive
damages.330
Fitch recommended that rated securitization trusts remove any exposure to loans
that were subject to assignee liability provisions in predatory lending statutes,331 since
compliance procedures alone are not enough to eliminate the risk of loss.332 The
existence of an assignee liability clause represents a meaningful risk to the transaction.
And so, Fitch stated it would not rate any transaction where assignee liability is combined
with unlimited liability, such as is the case with the Georgia Law.333 To rate a
transaction, Fitch requires that it be able to quantify the potential losses.334 Antipredatory laws with assignee liability clauses but capped liability allow Fitch to quantify
such losses.335 Fitch refused to rate all Georgia loans subject to the Georgia Law as long
as there was a potential for uncapped assignee liability.336
The Privileged Raters all refused to rate RMBS pools containing Georgia loans.
This response by the Privileged Raters evoked harsh criticism from consumer advocacy
groups, the mainstream media and some academics.337 Nonetheless, a number of lenders
indicated that they were preparing to pull out of the Georgia residential lending market
within days of the Privileged Raters’ announcements.338 And the Georgia legislature
found that it had to act to meet the Privileged Raters’ concerns as mortgage originators in
Georgia stated that they would not be able to make any more mortgage loans.339
Georgia had to act notwithstanding the fact that the GSEs disagreed with the
Privileged Raters’ assessment of the risks that investors faced from the Georgia Law.340
provides an assignee liability clause that adds all parties associated with the trust to the list of potential
defendants in a litigation case.”).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. See infra note 344.
338. Milligan, supra note 250, at 26 (“’Of course, cutting off Georgia mortgage originators from the
secondary market could have led to a catastrophic situation. It was going to cause a collapse of the mortgage
market in Georgia, and it came very close to happening before the law was amended,’ says [mortgage broker
industry representative] Rose. ‘We had over 40 lenders send us letters saying they would no longer do
business in the state of Georgia, except for jumbo loans.’").
339. Id (“Adds Allen Ken Knight, president of the Mortgage Bankers Association of Georgia, Macon,
Georgia, and vice president in charge of production at Dunwoody, Georgia-based Prestige Mortgage Co.,
"We were within days of not being able to write mortgage loans.").
340. See, e.g., Kelly K. Spors, Subprime Bill Aims to Mute State Laws: Republican’s
Proposal to Police Predatory Lending Would Set Weaker National Standards, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 2003, at
A4 (noting that Fannie and Freddie continued to buy some loans made in Georgia); FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT
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The GSEs assessment appears to have been borne out by (i) the fact that no investor has
suffered the effects that the Privileged Raters had predicted would result from the
purchase of loans that were subject to the Georgia Law341 and (ii) the legal analysis of
scholars that study predatory lending laws does not bear out the Chicken Little
interpretation of the Privileged Raters, but rather is in line with that of the GSEs.342
3. AsIts Mortgage Market Dries Up, Georgia Acquiesces to the
Demands of the Privileged Raters
Notwithstanding the weak analysis of the Privileged Raters, the Georgia
legislature quickly responded to the Privileged Raters by introducing an amendment to
the Georgia Law, which was enacted on March 7, 2003.343 In the months prior to the
enactment of the amendment, there were fruitless negotiations between consumer
advocacy groups and Privileged Raters as well as continuing disagreement among
legislators regarding how to respond to the Privileged Raters’ concerns.344
Notwithstanding this debate, the Georgia legislature amended the Georgia Law on March
7, 2003 (the “Amended Georgia Law”). In order to address the concerns of the
Privileged Raters, the Amended Georgia Law specified “when and against whom” claims
may be asserted, limited the liability that attached, and removed the “covered-loan”
category.345 The Amended Georgia Law provides a safe harbor to its assignee liability
provision, allowing assignees to avert liability by a showing of “reasonable due
diligence” to prevent the acquisition of GA High-Cost Home Loans.346 Assignee
liability is capped at the remaining indebtedness of the loan plus reasonable attorney’s
fees and may only attach from an individual lawsuit, not a class action.347

03-12, supra note 173; FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 03-02, supra note 173; Michael May Letter, supra note
173 (stating that Freddie Mac would continue to buy all loans made in New Jersey other than NJ High-Cost
Home Loans).
341. This evidence is far from compelling on its own because there are only a small number of loans that are
subject to the unamended Georgia Law.
342 See generally Azmy & Reiss, supra note 45 (analyzing risks posed by NJ Law); see also Engel &
McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 28,at 728 (“Costly litigation and significant judgments arguably could have
an adverse impact on the value of a loan pool. The reality, however, is that the risk that a securitized loan
pool will actually suffer losses from predatory lending litigation is quite small. This is because there are
practical impediments to bringing predatory lending claims and also because securitization deals are
intentionally structured to reduce such risk.”).
343. 2003 GEORGIA LAWS ACT 1 (S.B. 53).
344. See, e.g., Robert Luke & Henry Unger, Compromise Reached on GA. Lending Law, Legislature to Move
Quickly on Deal with Rating Agency, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 1, 2003, at F1; Henry Unger and Rhonda
Cook, Predatory Lending Law To Be Tweaked, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 24, 2003, at F1; Ernest Holsendolph
& Robert Luke, Mortgage Lenders Push to Rewrite Fair Lending Act, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 23, 2003, at
A1.
345. 2003 GEORGIA LAWS ACT 1.
346. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-6(b) (West 2004).
347. Id.
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4. The Privileged Raters Allow Georgia Loans To Be Securitized Under
an Amended Georgia Law
The Amended Georgia Law would prove to be more investor friendly, as the
Privileged Raters re-admitted Georgia Home Loans to their rated transactions within days
of the amendment.348 S&P responded on March 11, 2003, stating it would rate
transactions including Georgia Home Loans originated after March 7, 2003.349 It would
selectively allow Georgia High-Cost Home Loans, since the liability was capped, so long
as there was some credit support in place.350 This credit support could take the form of,
for instance, an agreement by a creditworthy institution to repurchase loans that were
made in violation of the law, to limit a securitization trust’s exposure to liability.351 S&P
also requires a compliance representation, a statement by a third party verifying the
Georgia Home Loan originators’ compliance with the statute, as part of its requirement to
rate a transaction containing such loans.352
Moody’s acted two days later, also finding that the risks associated with Georgia
Home Loans were permissible within its rated transactions.353 Moody’s discussion of
the statute identified practices that lenders and securitizers could implement to protect
securitization trusts from liability.354 Since the Amended Georgia Law includes
disclosure requirements,355 reasonableness standards,356 and imposes the strictest
requirements on “high-cost” home loans only,357 the Privileged Raters found that it gave
adequate direction to lenders.358 The Amended Georgia Law also addresses Moody’s
concerns regarding miscategorization of loans by removing the “covered-loan” category,
thus making it easier to identify the risks associated with individual loans.359 Even more
348. S&P and Moody’s both announced that they would rate all pools that do not contain Georgia High-Cost
Home Loans. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, Standard & Poor's Will Admit Georgia Mortgage Loans
Into Rated Structured Finance Transactions (Mar. 11, 2003), at http://www.standardandpoors.com
[hereinafter S&P ADMITS GA 3/11/03]; MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, MOODY'S TO RATE RMBS BACKED
BY GEORGIA HOME LOANS (Mar. 13, 2003), at http://www.moodys.com/. [hereinafter MOODY’S RATES GA
3/13/03]; Fitch announced that it would rate all residential mortgage pools, including those that contained
Georgia High-Cost Home Loans, if they also included additional credit enhancements. See Press Release,
Fitch Ratings, Fitch To Rate RMBS after Amendment to Georgia Predatory Lending Statute, GFLA (Mar.
14, 2003), at
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/sectors/rmbs_predatory_lending.cfm?sector_flag=3&marketsector=2
&detail=&body_content=pred_lend [hereinafter FITCH RATES GA 3/14/03].
349. S&P ADMITS GA 3/11/03, supra note 348.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. See, e.g., id.
353. MOODY’S RATES GA 3/13/03, supra note 348.
354. Id.
355. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-2(12)(B) (West 2004).
356. Id. at § 7-6A-4.
357. See generally MOODY’S RATES GA 3/13/03, supra note 348.
358. Id.
359. MOODY’S RATES GA 3/13/03, supra note 348.
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important to Moody’s, is the limitation on assignee liability to the remaining
indebtedness and reasonable attorney’s fees.360 Under the Amended Georgia Law,
Moody’s permits Georgia Home Loans in rated transactions so long as the issuer did the
following: gave representations and warranties that the loans were originated in
compliance with the law; gave a warranty to repurchase any loans that were, in fact,
originated in violation of the statute; and created due diligence procedures to satisfy the
safe harbor provisions of the law.361
Like S&P, Moody’s stated that it would selectively rate pools containing Georgia
High-Cost Home Loans, so long as such pools had no more than two percent of the total
loans in the pool and so long as such loans were within the clear, objective standards of
the statute. For instance, refinanced Georgia High-Cost Home Loans that could run afoul
of the law’s anti-flipping “reasonable tangible net benefit” test would not fall within a
clear, objective standard.362 While in theory Moody’s would rate pools with more than
two percent Georgia High-Cost Home Loans, it indicated that the credit support required
to rate such pools would be of prohibitive cost.363
On February 14, 2003, and closely following the path taken by S&P and
Moody’s, Fitch announced that it would rate pools including Georgia High-Cost Home
Loans, subject to additional credit enhancements.364 Fitch indicated that the changes to
the assignee liability provisions and limitations on damages assessed against assignees
prompted its change of position.365 Fitch did differ from the analysis of the other
Privileged Raters to some extent: it found that while the addition of the safe harbor
provision for “reasonable due diligence” reduces the risk of assignee liability,366 the safe
harbor provision was subjective because it did not define what “reasonable due diligence”
was.367 Nonetheless, because the law’s liability is in any case capped at the remaining
indebtedness of the loan plus reasonable attorney’s fees,368 Fitch stated it would rate
pools with Georgia Home Loans, subject to appropriate credit enhancements.369
360. Id. (“Finally, and perhaps most importantly to MBS investors, the Amended Act limits assignee liability
to the remaining indebtedness on the loan and reasonable attorney's fees, and limits class actions against
assignees.”).
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. (“Solid representations from financially strong issuers would take on increased importance where
high cost loans are included. Transactions containing more than two percent of such "high cost" loans, or
which contain any "high cost" loans where statutory compliance is a matter of judgment, may be subject to
additional protections that have a prohibitive cost. Ultimately, the risk to investors will vary depending on the
amount of "high cost" loans in question and the issuer's financial strength.”). The cost of including loans
originated prior to the enactment of the Amended Georgia Law but after the enactment of the Georgia Law
would also likely be prohibitively high since the amendment is not applied retroactively. Id.
364. FITCH RATES GA 3/14/03, supra note 348.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
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While the Privileged Raters’ decisions to rate transactions containing postAmended Georgia Law loans resolved Georgia’s funding crisis, they also bring to a head
questions as to the role that these private actors should have in setting standards for local
regulations of property and consumer finance transactions. In particular, to the extent
that the Privileged Raters are advocates for investors and thereby inaccurately evaluate
the risk posed by state predatory lending laws,370 it is important to ask whether
Privileged Raters should have the power to veto laws enacted by the several states.
E.

The Privileged Raters Take a Stance against Strong Predatory Lending
Legislation

Shortly after admitting Georgia loans into securitization transactions, each of the
three Privileged Raters issued reports detailing rating criteria for transactions containing
loans subject to anti-predatory lending laws. These reports put state legislatures on notice
as to the Privileged Raters’ rating requirements and effectively set a framework for
standardizing predatory lending legislation that followed.
Moody’s was first to issue such a comprehensive report on March 26, 2003.
Moody’s released a special report regarding the impact of predatory lending on RMBS
transactions, changing its position from that of its April, 2000 report in light of recentlyenacted anti-predatory lending laws “without well-defined compliance procedures” and
which “entail unlimited potential liability.”371 Moody’s report stated that such
problematic statutes cause difficulty in the securitization process372 because violations
of anti-predatory lending statutes reduce the amount of available cash to pay investors.373
Although, it acknowledged that there were measures that lenders could take to reduce
their potential liability, Moody’s stated it would not rate transactions unless certain
additional conditions for securitization are met.374 Those conditions included (i)
sufficiently clear statutes so that the lender may comply and (ii) limited statutory
penalties for non-compliance.375 Even with such conditions, Moody’s indicated that
there remains a risk to investors, because lenders may, in certain circumstances, choose to
default rather than repurchase afflicted loans.376

370. See supra Part V.D.2.
371. Press Release, Moody’s Investor Service, Moody’s Reports on Impact of Predatory Lending Laws on
RMBS (Mar. 26, 2003).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. The other conditions included the lender’s demonstration of effective compliance procedures; lender
representations that loans comply with statutory requirements; lender agreement to repurchase loans that do
not comply with statutory requirements; lender indemnification for damages from the statute under certain
circumstances; lender’s demonstration that it has the “financial resources and commitment to the business” to
demonstrate willingness and ability to honor its repurchase and indemnification obligations;” and
agreement to concentration limits where the penalties are great or the statutes are ambiguous. Id.
376. Id.
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S&P released its report on April 15, 2003, stating that it would subject RMBS
pools containing loans from jurisdictions with anti-predatory lending laws to a legal
evaluation of the statute of each state.377 Its legal evaluation methodology was quite
similar to that of Moody’s. It first considered whether a state’s anti-predatory lending
statute provides for assignee liability.378 Where predatory lending laws do provide for
assignee liability, S&P would look for clearly delineated loan categories, analyzing
whether a purchaser (or servicer) can reasonably determine the category of loan.379 S&P
then would analyze the severity of penalties, including monetary damages, though even
capped categorical damages may pose unlimited liability under the cumulative effect of
some laws, such as those that allow for class actions suits.380 S&P would not rate
transactions containing loans that fall into statutory categories that allow for assignee
liability combined with uncapped damages.381 S&P would, however, rate loans with
capped liability; though the cost of required credit enhancements for some capped
liability categories of loans could be prohibitive of securitization.382
Fitch responded to the other two Privileged Raters’ rating criteria with its own
document on May 1, 2003, which announced changes to its rating methodology.383 Fitch
maintains the position, like the other Privileged Raters, that it would not rate pools
containing loans subject to unlimited assignee liability.384 Fitch also required warranties
of compliance385 and, if no high cost home loans are in the transaction, a representation
and warranty of such.386 Fitch reserved the right to rate RMBS transactions in
jurisdictions where there is assignee liability where that liability is “reasonably
377. Press Release, Standard and Poor’s, Evaluating Predatory Lending Laws: Standard & Poor's Explains Its
Approach (Apr. 15, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html. [hereinafter S&P
EVALUATING PREDATORY LENDING 4/15/03]
378. Id. Loans subject to predatory lending laws that do not provide for assignee liability will not raise rating
difficulties for S&P. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. A statute’s clarity in its provisions for violations and safe harbor practices may mitigate the required
credit enhancements. Id. S&P also stated that ratings of pools subject to predatory lending laws must include
a qualitative determination of a seller’s compliance procedures and the ability to identify predatory loans and
loans subject to assignee liability. Id. S&P also requires a determination of the seller’s creditworthiness, to
establish “if the seller is willing and financially able to repurchase predatory loans for a purchase price that
would make the securitization trust whole for any costs incurred in connection with the predatory loan.” Id.
This rating methodology would determine what credit enhancement was necessary for a particular
securitization. Id.
383. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Revises Rating Criteria in Wake of Predatory Lending Legislation
(May 1, 2003), at
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/events/press_releases_detail.cfm?pr_id=85826&sector_flag=3&marke
tsector=2&detail [hereinafter FITCH REVISES CRITERIA 5/1/03].
384. Id.
385. Id. (“Fitch expects the representation and warranty from the issuer to identify the loans by: 1) type
(high cost, covered, etc.), 2) quantity, 3) aggregate dollar amount, and, 4) jurisdiction.”)
386. Id.
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limited.”387 Where a breach of those warranties takes place, Fitch requires a repurchase
of the affected loan.388
Like the other Privileged Raters, Fitch may require credit enhancements based
upon measurements of the severity and frequency of loss for loans covered by predatory
lending statutes contained within a securitization trust.389 Frequency of loss considers
three factors: the number of prohibited acts under the statute,390 safe harbor
provisions,391 and statutory clarity.392 Fitch’s credit enhancement analysis will also
include a legal and qualitative analysis of the applicable statute by jurisdiction; the type
of loans included in the transaction; compliance procedures by the originator/servicer;
and the due diligence review by the relevant parties, such as the originator.393
These reports by the three Privileged Raters represent the most comprehensive
statements by each of them regarding predatory lending legislation. Each of the
Privileged Raters took issue with specific types of provisions: subjective standards,
statutory clarity, assignee liability and unlimited liability. It is of note that the Privileged
Raters all acted within five weeks of each other and issued mostly parallel guidelines as
to the treatment of predatory lending laws that allowed for assignee liability and
unquantifiable damages. These parallel moves could be troubling, given that the
Privileged Raters do not face any competition in the grant of regulatory rating licenses.
As a result, if the three Privileged Raters mistakenly interpret the predatory lending laws,
there is little hope that market pressures will make them correct themselves.

387. Id.
388. Id. (“In the event of a breach of any such representation or warranty, Fitch will expect a repurchase of
the affected loan at the applicable repurchase price. The repurchase price should be equal to: 1) the
outstanding indebtedness of the loan (including, but not limited to late fees), plus accrued interest, plus, 2)
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs and all other damages which may be incurred by an RMBS transaction
under any applicable predatory or abusive lending law. Since the repurchase of the loan will not necessarily
insulate an RMBS transaction from assignee or purchaser liability, credit enhancement levels may be
adjusted for those RMBS transactions which contain loans originated in jurisdictions with laws that contain
such provisions.”)
389. Id. Loss severity is calculated by determining the maximum recovery allowed by law under a worst-case
scenario. Id.
390. Id. (“loans subject to a high number of prohibitive acts (e.g. 'high cost' or 'covered' loans) result in an
increased likelihood of a violation. These loans are subject to a higher frequency than loans which are subject
to a low number of prohibitive act violations (e.g. 'home' loans).”).
391. Id. (“Fitch believes that assignee 'safe harbor' clauses may reduce the ability of a borrower to recover
from an assignee or purchaser of a loan. Therefore, if the legislation contains safe harbor provisions which
limit the exposure of the RMBS transaction to the borrower and if Fitch is comfortable that the safe harbor
provisions are available to the RMBS transaction, the additional frequency assigned to a particular loan in
that jurisdiction may be significantly reduced.”).
392. Id. (“Due to potential errors, such as APRs being calculated incorrectly for loans in certain categories,
lenders may unintentionally code a loan as a 'home loan' that is later determined to be a 'high cost' or
'covered' loan - which may ultimately subject the RMBS issuer to assignee liability. In order to protect
against this risk, Fitch may assign an added frequency factor to loans originated in jurisdictions with laws that
contain assignee or purchaser liability provisions.”).
393. Id.
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F.

The New Jersey Experience: Testing the Privileged Raters’ Resolve

New Jersey’s Home Ownership Security Act (the “New Jersey Law” or
“HOSA”) became effective on November 26, 2003 after the three Privileged Raters
issued their comprehensive guidelines on predatory lending statutes. New Jersey
amended HOSA (the “Amended New Jersey Law”) on July 6th, 2004, after the Privileged
Raters decided not to rate pools containing certain types of New Jersey loans. Like the
Georgia Law, the New Jersey Law prohibits specific lender practices for three categories
of loans and it includes assignee liability394 and punitive damages provisions because
they expose investors to unlimited liability.395 These two provisions were most
problematic for the Privileged Raters.
New Jersey original statute attempted to hew its own path on solving the problem
of predatory lending, but the Privileged Raters ultimately forced New Jersey back to the
standardized path that they had promulgated in their guidelines when New Jersey
amended its law the year after it was first enacted.
1. The Original New Jersey Law
The New Jersey Law, like the Georgia Law, created three categories of loans
which are subject to increasing levels of regulation and follows similar thresholds to
define its categories. “New Jersey Home Loans” were the broadest category, applicable
to one-to-six family principle dwelling secured by a mortgage or deed of trust, or a
security interest in a manufactured home.396 Unlike the comparable Georgia Law
category, “New Jersey Covered Home Loans” were defined by a points and fees trigger
only; that is, it does not have an APR trigger. New Jersey Covered Home Loans included
loans that had points and fees greater than 4% for loans greater than $40,000, and a
higher trigger for other loans.397 Like the Georgia Law, the New Jersey Law
incorporated HOEPA’s APR trigger to define “NJ High-Cost Home Loans.” The New
Jersey Law also set a points and fees trigger on a sliding scale, all lower than HOEPA’s
standards: (i) for total loan amounts of $40,000 or greater, 5% or more of the total loan

394. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-27 (West 2004) (setting forth assignee liability for certain types of loans).
395. Id. § 46:10B-29(b) (“Punitive damages, when the violation was malicious or reckless in appropriate
circumstances as determined by the fact-finder;”).
396. Id. § 46:10B-24(3) (“Home Loan”). The New Jersey Law prohibits as economically unjustifiable the
same practices as the Georgia Law for all New Jersey Home Loans. Those practices include: packing single
premium credit insurance into fees, Id. § 46:10B-25(a); encouraging default, Id. § 46:10B-25(c); late payment
fees outside set limitations, Id. §46:10B -25(d)(1-5) (i); discretionary loan acceleration, Id. § 46:10B25(4)(e); and charging fees for a payoff letter. Id. §46:10B -25(f). Of course, these prohibitions also apply to
all New Jersey Covered Home Loans and New Jersey High-Cost Home Loans, as such loans are types of the
New Jersey Home Loans.
397. Id. § 46:10B-24 (“Covered Home Loan”). The points and fees trigger is 4.5% for loans that have
principal amounts of less than $40,000 or if insured by the Fair Housing Administration (“FHA”) or
guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”).
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amount and higher proportions for smaller loans.398 The New Jersey Law also added
two new subcategories of Home Loans, “Home Improvement Loans,” which were Home
Loans made in connection with home improvements; and “Manufactured Housing
Loans,” which were Home Loans made in connection with manufactured homes.399
Like its Georgia Law counterpart, the New Jersey Law’s “New Jersey Covered
Home Loan” category had only one limitation particular to that category of loan: it bans
loan flipping where there is no “reasonable tangible net benefit.”400 The New Jersey
High-Cost Home Loan category also incorporated similar prohibitions as the comparable
Georgia Law category.401
The New Jersey Law’s assignee liability provision allowed New Jersey High
Cost Home Loan borrowers to assert all affirmative claims and defenses against
purchasers and assignees.402 The New Jersey Law did provide a safe harbor provision
for unwary secondary market purchasers who can show that they exercised due diligence
in identifying and avoiding the purchase of “High Cost Home Loans.”403 Like the
Georgia Law, the New Jersey Law limited assignee liability for the “Covered Home
Loan” category to the outstanding obligation plus costs and attorney’s fees.404 Remedies
under the act included statutory damages,405 punitive damages,406 reasonable costs and
attorney’s fees,407 injunctive relief, declaratory and equitable relief.408
2. The Privileged Raters Quickly Respond
Although it did not go into effect until November 26, 2003, Governor
McGreevey signed the New Jersey Law on May 1, 2003. The day after the Governor
signed HOSA, S&P announced that it would not rate pools that contain certain New
398. Id. (“total points and fees threshold”). The thresholds for smaller loans are as follows: for total loan
amounts of $20,000 to $39,999, 6% of the total loan amount; and for total loan amounts of $1 to $19,999, the
lesser of $1,000 or 6%.
399. See generally Azmy & Reiss, supra note 45, at 645 (describing treatment under New Jersey Law of
Home Improvement Loans and Manufactured Housing Loans). Manufactured homes include the following:
modular homes, panelized homes, pre-cut homes, and mobile homes. See id.
400. § 46:10B-25(b).
401. § 46:10B-26. These prohibitions include those on balloon payments, negative amortization, default
interest rates, prepaid finance charges, limitations on access to legal remedies, the making of loans without
mandatory notices, the making of loans without mandatory counseling, the direct payment to home
improvement contractors (that is, the bypassing of the borrower when lender makes payments on home
improvement loans), loan modification fees, same-creditor refinances of existing New Jersey High Cost
Home Loans, and the financing of fees greater than 2% of the total loan balance. Id.
402. § 46:10B-27(a).
403. § 46:10B-29(c).
404. Id.
405. § 46:10B-29(b)(1)(a).
406. § 46:10B-29(b)(1)(b).
407. § 46:10B-29(b)(1)(c).
408. § 46:10B-29(b)(2).
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Jersey residential loans.409 In contrast to S&P, Moody’s and Fitch quickly concluded
that, despite some ambiguities in the Act’s damages provisions, the risks to assignees
were low enough that they would continue to rate pools containing most types of New
Jersey residential loans. Thus, despite similarities between the original Georgia Law and
the New Jersey Law, Moody’s and Fitch reacted differently to New Jersey’s law,
appearing to prevent a repeat of the funding crisis that occurred in Georgia despite S&P’s
more restrictive position.
S&P reported its position regarding the New Jersey Law more than 6 months
before the law would become effective. S&P stated that it would not allow several
categories of New Jersey loans within securitizations that it rated, claiming that several of
the Act’s damages provisions were unclear and, therefore might expose assignees to
unlimited liability.410 Those categories include “High-Cost Home Loans,” “Covered
Home Loans,” “Home Improvement Loans,” and “Manufactured Housing Loans.” S&P
stated it would allow “Home Loans,” reverse mortgages and loans on non-primary
residences in its rated transactions.411
Even though Moody’s and Fitch indicated that they would still rate transactions
containing New Jersey mortgage loans, S&P’s position threatened to destabilize the New
Jersey mortgage market and motivated the lending industry in New Jersey to lobby for a
significant dilution of the New Jersey Law’s assignee liability provisions.412 However,
many of S&P’s concerns were unmerited. For example, S&P asserted, without clear
explanation, that the Act creates unlimited liability for assignees of “Covered Home
Loans.”413 However, assignee liability for New Jersey Covered Home Loans is
specifically limited by the Act (i) to suits brought in an individual capacity and (ii) for
damages that cannot exceed the borrower’s remaining obligation under the loan plus
costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.414
Fitch took a more accepting opinion of the New Jersey Law on June 5, 2003,415
following its revised criteria.416 In contrast to S&P’s position, Fitch stated it would rate
409. Press Release, Standard and Poor’s, S&P Report Addresses New Jersey State Predatory Lending Law
(May 2, 2003), at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html [hereinafter S&P REPORT ADDRESSES NJ];
see Randy Diamond, Mortgage Reform Law In Trouble From Start; Rating Service Raises Worries about
Liability, BERGEN COUNTY REC., May 3, 2003, A1 (“S&P said it was concerned the law would hold issuers,
and in some cases buyers, of mortgage-backed securities liable for violations.”).
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. S&P SURPRISES LENDERS; DECISION NOT TO RATE CERTAIN POOLS CUTS NEW PREDATORY LAW
SUPPORT, BROKER, JUNE/JULY 2003, at 30 (quoting E. Robert Levy, Executive Director, Mortgage Bankers
Ass’n of New Jersey/League of Mortgage Lenders, “We obviously are not going to be able to live with the
bill in the present form, unless S&P changes their position”).
413. S&P EVALUATING PREDATORY LENDING 4/15/03, supra note 377.
414. Azmy & Reiss, supra note 45,at 702 -03; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-27(b)-(c) (West 2004).
415. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Ratings Responds to New Jersey Predatory Lending Legislation
(June 5, 2003) at
http://www.fitchratings.com/corporate/sectors/rmbs_predatory_lending.cfm?sector_flag=3&marketsector=2
&detail=&body_content=pred_lend [hereinafter FITCH RATINGS RESPONDS TO NJ].
416. Id.
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“Covered Home Loans,” “Manufactured Home Loans,” and “Home Improvement Loans”
in its rated transactions,417 subject to the appropriate credit enhancement.418 Fitch
believed that the risks posed by New Jersey were less than those posed by Georgia
because the New Jersey Law allows for mitigating factors.419 Predictably, Fitch declined
to rate New Jersey High Cost Home Loans since the combination of unlimited liability
and assignee liability present an unquantifiable liability to investors.420
While New Jersey High Cost Home Loans can be part of a rated transaction due
to errors in the origination process,421 Fitch recognized the adequacy of New Jersey’s
safe harbor provisions which limit the exposure of lenders with reasonable compliance
procedures in place.422 Fitch determined that a third party certification of the loan pool,
which includes recalculation of the APRs based on information taken from the loans
documents would be sufficient to satisfy Fitch’s due diligence requirements.423 While
Fitch questioned what “reasonable due diligence” would suffice to invoke the New Jersey
Law’s safe harbor provisions,424 it stated that it would not rate any transactions where
sellers could not show evidence that its compliance procedures fall within the safe harbor
provisions, as those provisions were interpreted by Fitch.425
Unlike S&P and Fitch, Moody’s stated on September 22, 2003 that it would rate
pools containing New Jersey High Cost Home Loans and New Jersey Covered Home
Loans.426 While recognizing that these two categories pose greater risk to investors than
ordinary “Home Loans,” Moody’s stated that few of those loans would be securitized
based on that inherent risk.427 New Jersey High Cost Home Loans bear the risk of
damages including the outstanding balance of the loan plus costs, as well as the potential
for class action lawsuits.428 Refinanced New Jersey High Cost Home Loans pose even
greater risk to the investor based on the requirement that the refinance provide a

417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Richard Newman, Fitch Won’t Rate High-Cost Loans in New Jersey; Predatory Lending Laws Causing
Concern on Wall Street, BERGEN COUNTY REC., June 6, 2003, at B1 (“ "Georgia had unlimited liability that
could not be mitigated," said Fitch's senior director, Michael Nelson.”).
420. FITCH RATINGS RESPONDS TO NJ, supra note 415.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id. (“The Act is unclear as to what will be considered reasonable due diligence in New Jersey under the
limited damages provision of the Act.”).
425. Id.
426. MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, MOODY’S TO CONTINUE TO RATE RMBS BACKED BY NEW JERSEY HOME
LOANS (Sept 22, 2003) [hereinafter MOODY’S TO CONTINUE TO RATE NJ].
427. Id. (Moody's “believes that two categories of loans defined in the New Jersey Act – ‘high cost home
loans’ and refinanced ‘covered home loans’ - represent increased risks to RMBS securitizations. Thus, the
agency expects that few of the "high cost home loans" and refinanced "covered home loans" originated in
New Jersey will be securitized.”).
428. Id.
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“reasonable tangible net benefit.”429 Because of the subjective standard, Moody’s stated
it would exclude refinanced high cost home loans from its rated transactions.430
Otherwise, Moody’s will rate pools that have less than 2% purchase money (e.g., not
refinanced) New Jersey High Cost Home Loans.431 Moody’s will allow up to 5%
refinanced New Jersey Covered Home Loans432 even though such loans are subject to
the “reasonable tangible net benefit” requirement, because New Jersey Covered Home
Loans are not exposed to unlimited liability and are not subject to class action
lawsuits.433 Moody’s placed no limit on purchase money “Covered Home Loans.” 434
Moody’s also requires the repurchase of loans that violate its guidelines and
indemnification of the securitization trust for any losses incurred because of the inclusion
of such a loan.435 All other loans may be included in rated transactions as long as the
issuer demonstrates strong compliance procedures with the New Jersey Law,436 and due
diligence procedures to avail themselves of the safe harbor provision.437 While S&P
stated that the loan categories were unclear,438 subjecting assignees to potential liability,
Moody’s stated that the New Jersey Law provided clear and defined thresholds which
permit effective compliance procedures.439 Consumer advocates lauded Moody’s
position, stating that it correctly balanced the needs of consumers and investors.440 And
indeed, this seemed to be the case. But just getting Moody’s on board would not be
enough to satisfy secondary market players; given that RMBS transactions typically need
a rating from both Moody’s and S&P, S&P’s actions were closely watched.
3. S&P Backs Down

429. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24 (“Covered Home Loan”) (West 2004).
430. MOODY’S TO CONTINUE TO RATE NJ, supra note 426. (“Among other things, the New Jersey Act requires
"high cost home loans" that refinance existing loans to provide a "tangible net benefit" to borrowers.
Christine Lachnicht, a Moody's vice president-senior analyst, indicated that "because the New Jersey Act
does not provide an objective standard for what constitutes a "tangible net benefit," it will be more difficult
for lenders and issuers to implement and demonstrate effective compliance and due diligence procedures for
refinanced "high cost home loans." Therefore, Moody's anticipates that the risk of including refinanced high
cost loans in RMBS deals will eliminate their inclusion in future deals.”).
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. See supra Part V.F.1.
439. MOODY’S TO CONTINUE TO RATE NJ, supra note 426.
440. See, e.g., Richard Newman, Moody’s Differs On Predatory Lending Law; Will Rate Pools Including
High-Cost Mortgages, BERGEN COUNTY REC., Sept. 23, 2003 at L8 (quoting Debbie Goldstein, a consumer
advocate, as saying , “Moody's successfully balanced the needs of consumers in protecting their homes from
foreclosure and in protecting investors against "unintended consequences" - such as catastrophic liability for
an inadvertent purchase of a loan that's in violation of the law.”).
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H. Robert Tillman, head of the New Jersey Department of Banking and Finance,
commented on the relative positions of the Privileged Raters, stating, “All of the major
rating agencies do not have to agree on how to treat New Jersey loans. The market can
function with Moody's and Fitch."441 This proved to be an optimistic assessment.
From the day after the law was signed to the day before it came into
effectiveness, S&P maintained its position that the New Jersey Law lacked clarity and as
such, New Jersey loans could not be included in their rated transactions. Then, S&P
backed down from its original position on the New Jersey Law two days prior to the
effective date of the New Jersey Law. Notwithstanding its denial, it appears that S&P’s
purpose in responding so quickly to the New Jersey law was to push New Jersey to
amend the law prior to its effective date while ensuring that it could keep this business if
the NJ Law was not amended.
As it appeared that the NJ Law would not be amended, S&P released a report on
the role of predatory lending laws in RMBS transactions on October 7, 2003. The report
speculates generally on the effect of laws, such as the New Jersey Law, on lender’s
practices, stating that lenders may reduce lending in a particular state to protect
themselves, the increased compliance cost may make such loans unprofitable, and that a
decreased purchase market may prompt a reduction in originations.442 S&P goes on to
state that predatory lending laws may reduce the funds available to pay investors in
RMBS transactions that contain loans from jurisdictions with tough predatory lending
laws,443 which is most relevant to S&P and is determinative of its ratings.444 S&P then
reiterated its previous issues with assignee liability and uncapped liability.445 S&P
concludes by stating that while it is in favor of predatory lending laws, its role is to assess
risk associated with RMBS transactions and not to make public policy.446 This statement
is inconsistent with its actions.
While S&P’s October 7th report did not address the New Jersey Law directly, it
takes a less restrictive position on anti-predatory lending laws than that contained in its
May 2, 2003 statement on the New Jersey Law. Interestingly, the report serves one of
three conceivable purposes. First, it is possible that S&P expected an upcoming
amendment to the New Jersey Law but needed a basis to amend its previous report in
case the law did not change. Second, S&P may have felt pressured to reaffirm its stance,
separate from those of Moody’s and Fitch, after Moody’s September 22, 2003 report
441. Id.
442. Press Release, Standard and Poor’s, Anti-Predatory Lending Laws Assume a Prominent Role in the US
RMBS Market (Oct. 7, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id. (“Standard & Poor's has stated that, as a public policy matter, it is in favor of statutes that attempt to
curb predatory lending. Standard & Poor's also acknowledges, however, that its role is to evaluate the credit
risk to investors associated with anti-predatory lending legislation and not to recommend public policy. The
making of public policy is the responsibility of elected officials.”). While facially attractive, there is
something incoherent about this position: if S&P cannot consider public policy in its assessments, the fact
that it favors something as a matter of public policy is of no practical effect.
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directly contradicted S&P’s position that the statute was unclear as to the categorization
of loans. Last, S&P having faced scrutiny in the press from consumer advocacy groups,
may have needed to assuage the tensions it generated by undercutting the effectiveness of
a consumer protection law.
S&P revised its position on November 25, 2003,447 two days before the New
Jersey Law would go into effect, stating it would rate the formerly disallowed “Covered
Home Loans,” “Manufactured Home Loans” and “Home Improvement Loans.”448 Like
Fitch’s and Moody’s positions, S&P now required compliance representations and
demonstrated compliance procedures sufficient to identify New Jersey High-Cost Home
Loans, New Jersey Covered Home Loans and whether such loans are in violation of the
statute.449 Unlike Moody’s, S&P still excluded “High-Cost Home Loans.”450 To that
extent, S&P requires an “exclusion representation,” that is, representations of effective
procedures to exclude New Jersey High Cost Home Loans so the loans in a pool can fall
within the New Jersey Law’s safe harbor provision.451 Finally, the party making
compliance and exclusion representations must be financially stable enough to repurchase
loans that violate S&P’s guidelines and indemnify the securitization trust for losses
incurred by such violations.452
As of the New Jersey Law’s effective date, the New Jersey experience stands in
stark contrast to the lending catastrophe that nearly occurred in Georgia. Differences in
the laws arguably demonstrate an intent by New Jersey state legislature to afford
investors greater ability to avoid harsh penalties while remaining steadfastly opposed to
predatory lending practices. Yet, S&P’s markedly similar responses to the two laws, as
compared to the more nuanced responses of its competitors, raise concerns as to whether
it is biased. Their initial position highlights their interest in supporting secondary market
investors rather than fair and equitable lending practices. Even so, New Jersey would not
be able to withstand S&P’s next change of position which occurred on May 13, 2004.
4. S&P Reverses Course and Imposes New Restrictions, Forcing New
Jersey To Amend Its Law
On that date, S&P released its new evaluation criteria for rating RMBS
transactions.453 The new criteria subjected loans in each jurisdiction to a quantitative
447 Press Release, Standard and Poor’s, Standard & Poor's Permits Additional New Jersey Mortgage Loans
Into Rated Single Family Transactions (Nov. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/srchindex.html.
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Id. (“Standard & Poor's will continue to exclude High-Cost Home Loans because of the potential for
uncapped statutory and punitive damages.”).
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Press Release, Standard & Poor's , Standard & Poor's Clarifies Credit Risk Posed by Anti-Predatory
Lending Laws (May 2004), at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/news/04/0518.html [hereinafter
STANDARD & POOR'S CLARIFIES].
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analysis to account for the clarity of the statutory provision,454 the potential loss
severity,455 and potential mitigating factors.456 “Standard & Poor's believes that when
the risk associated with violating an anti-predatory lending law is quantifiable, Standard
& Poor's will allow loans governed by that law in its rated transactions.”457 In
jurisdictions with assignee liability and the potential for liability in excess of the original
balance of the loan,458 it took the position that the risk assessment must be increased
where the anti-predatory lending laws have subjective standards. S&P requires credit
enhancements to properly evaluate those risks in specific jurisdictions.459
In deciding that sellers of NC High Cost Home Loans did not require further
credit enhancements, S&P found that the NC Law had among the highest loss severity
percentages460 among jurisdictions with quantifiable damages461 and subjective
standards;462 but also had sufficient mitigating factors463 which are determinative of the
credit enhancement requirement for jurisdictions with assignee liability and quantifiable
damages.464 In contrast, S&P refused to rate both Georgia and New Jersey high cost
home loans because of the lack of quantifiable damages and sufficient safe harbors, even
though they had lower loss severity percentages. Because S&P’s required credit
enhancements would impose unacceptable costs on the New Jersey mortgage market, the

454. Press Release, Standard & Poor's Implements Credit Enhancement Criteria and Revises Representation
and Warranty Criteria for Including Anti-Predatory Lending Law Loans in U.S. Rated Structured Finance
Transactions(May 13, 2004), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/news/04/0518.html
[hereinafter S&P IMPLEMENTS CREDIT ENHANCEMENTS].
455. Id. (“The loss severity on each affected loan will be calculated based on the jurisdiction, taking into
account the principal balance of each loan, the interest rate, and the term of the loan. After calculating this
loss severity, Standard & Poor's will determine the number of defensive claims (claims raised by the
borrower in a foreclosure action) by using the appropriate foreclosure frequency. It will then determine the
frequency of affirmative claims (claims made against the lender prior to default of the loans) by assuming
that a percentage of the nondefaulted loans are likely to be subject to affirmative claims. The total credit
enhancement for affected loans is then calculated based on the percentage of losses on affirmative and
defensive claims. Therefore, the total credit enhancement will depend on the number loans in each pool,
foreclosure frequencies, and the jurisdictional distribution of the loans.”).
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. STANDARD & POOR'S CLARIFIES, supra note 453.
459. S&P IMPLEMENTS CREDIT ENHANCEMENTS, supra note 454 (“Standard & Poor's credit enhancement is
based on an assessment of potential losses to the securitization transaction. This calculation involves an
evaluation of several factors, including the number of successful lawsuits likely to be asserted against the
issuer based on the jurisdictions involved, statutory borrower rights, the maximum potential damages that
could be awarded, and an assessment of the likely amount of damages to be awarded.”).
460. Id. (finding that North Carolina has loss severity percentage of 275%).
461. Id. (noting that loans with unquantifiable liability are excluded from S&P’s ratings).
462. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24:10:2(c) (West 2004) (setting “reasonable and tangible net benefit” standard).
463. S&P IMPLEMENTS CREDIT ENHANCEMENTS, supra note 454.
464. Id. (comparing (i) Cleveland Heights, Ohio’s statute with a loss severity percentage of 37% and no
mitigating factors that requires credit enhancements with (ii) North Carolina’s statute with a loss severity of
275% and mitigating factors that does not require credit enhancements).
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New Jersey legislature was forced to acquiesce and amend its predatory lending law on
July 6, 2004.465
There were three important amendments to HOSA that were in response to rating
agency concerns.466 First, the Covered Home Loan category was removed because the
Privileged Raters found the loan flipping test too ambiguous.467 Second, the amendment
limited plaintiffs from seeking HOSA’s remedies in class actions; this change (in addition
to reducing potential recoveries for plaintiffs) allowed the Privileged Raters to more
easily quantify potential damages under the law.468 Finally, the amendment granted New
Jersey’s Department of Banking and Insurance the power to promulgate regulations to
effectuate the intent and purpose of all of the provisions of HOSA (as opposed to the
handful of provisions that DOBI had authority over in the original statute), a change that
would again reduce ambiguity for the Privileged Raters.469 While these changes are not
uniformly bad, they tend to be pro-lender and were adopted largely to satisfy the
demands of Standard & Poors.
VI.

THREE FORCES MAY STANDARDIZE THE OPERATIONS OF THE
SUBPRIME MARKET

In addition to Privileged Rater predatory lending law underwriting guidelines,
there are two other forces that may impose greater standardization upon the subprime
mortgage market: (1) federal preemption by legislation and/or regulation and (2) GSE
buying guidelines. Standardization can take many forms and can vary in scope. Each
push to standardize must be independently evaluated to determine whether it is desirable.
A.

Federal Preemption Is Premature

The United States has a dual banking system, one in which both states and the
federal government charter and regulate banks and other savings institutions. Within this
dual system, the federal government has the power to preempt state lending regulations.
Indeed, federal regulators have already preempted the application of state predatory
lending laws to a broad array of lending institutions and Congress is considering
legislation to preempt their application to the remaining financial institutions that are still

465. See, e.g., Erick Bergquist, Predatory Laws: S&P’s Awkward Position, AM. BANKER, May 18, 2004, at
1, 1 (finding that S&P credit enhancements for New Jersey loans would be “high enough to scare lenders
away.”).
466. 2004N.J. Laws 84.
467. Id. As an apparent compromise for eliminating the Covered Home Loan category the amended law
broadened the scope of the NJ High-Cost Home Loan category to include more loans. Another important,
pro-lender change was the exclusion of prepayment penalties from the “points and fees calculation” when a
refinancing occurs by the same broker but with a different lender. Id.
468. Id.
469. Id.
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regulated by such laws. Professor Azmy has exhaustively reviewed these efforts and they
merely require summarizing and updating for my purposes.470
1. Regulatory Preemption
The Office of Thrift Supervision, which regulates savings and loans and savings
banks, has preempted state predatory loans as to those entities and their operating
subsidiaries.471 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has also preempted state
predatory lending laws as to national banks and their operating subsidiaries.472
These preemption actions will only have a modest effect on the efficacy of
predatory lending laws; it is generally agreed that federally-regulated lenders do not
engage in much predatory lending.473 The only aspect of these preemption rulings that
will significantly impact predatory lending is that they also apply to the state-chartered
operating subsidiaries of nationally-chartered lenders. Major nationally chartered lenders
have purchased subprime lenders that have been accused of predatory behaviors474 which
will not be subject to state predatory lending laws. But there is reason to believe that

470. See generally Azmy, supra note 66, at 382-90.
471. See, e.g., Carolyn J. Buck, Preemption of New Mexico Home Loan Protection Act 1-2 (Office of Thrift
Supervision, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Opinion of Chief Counsel No. P-2003-6, 2003) [hereinafter OTS
Opinion of Chief Counsel No. P-2003-6]; Carolyn J. Buck, Preemption of New Jersey Predatory Lending Act
1 (Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Opinion of Chief Counsel P-2003-5); Carolyn J.
Buck, Preemption of New York Predatory Lending Law 1 (Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, Opinion of Chief Counsel P-2003- 2); Carolyn J. Buck, Preemption of Georgia Fair Lending Act 1
(Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Opinion of Chief Counsel P-2003- 1).
472. 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34 (2004). The National Credit Union Administration has also preempted HOSA as to
federal credit unions, New Jersey Homeownership Security Act of 2002, NCUA Op. Assoc. Gen. Counsel
(Jan. 28, 2004), available athttp://www.ncua.gov/RegulationsOpinionsLaws/opinion_letters/2003_letters/03 1106.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2005), and has promulgated regulations that preempt a broad swath of state
lending laws. 12 C.F.R. § 701.21(b) (2004). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is also considering a
Petition for Rulemaking to Preempt Certain State Laws, which may preempt state predatory lending laws as
to the interstate operations of state-chartered members of the FDIC. 70 Fed. Reg. 13413 (Mar. 21, 2005).
But again, FDIC-insured entities do not appear to among the main predatory lenders. See Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection's Examination Assessment of
Subprime Lending at 2 (Audit Report No. 03-019, March 18, 2003) (estimating that 1.35 percent of all FDICinsured institutions had significant holdings of subprime assets.).
473. The OCC has determined that as far as national banks are concerned, “there were 178 lenders whose
business focus was subprime mortgage lending in 2001. The majority, or 112 (63%), were independent
mortgage companies. Of the remaining lenders, 30 (17%) were non-bank affiliates and only 36 (20%) were
depository institutions or their direct subsidiaries.” Comptroller of the Currency Adm’r of Nat’l Banks,
Economic Issues in Predatory Lending 4 (Office of Comptroller of the Currency, Working Paper, 2003),
available athttp://www.occ.treas.gov/workingpaper.pdf (July 30, 2003); WEICHER, , supra note 54,at 37.
474. See, e.g., HSBC Holdings PLC: Regulators, Shareholders Clear Household International Deal, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 31, 2003, at B4 (describing HSBC’s acquisition of subprime lender Household International);
Chiwon Yom, Limited-Purpose Banks: Their Specialties, Performance, and Prospects at 18-20 (FDIC Draft
FOB-2004-07-.1, June 2004) (describing First Union National Bank’s acquisition of subprime lender The
Money Store); Citigroup Closes Associates Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at C12 (describing Citigroup’s
acquisition of subprime lender Associates First Capital Corporation).

9/10/ 2005

62

SUBPRIME STANDARDIZATION

nationally chartered lenders will not tolerate predatory behaviors in their operating
subsidiaries because of reputational concerns475 and existing regulation.476
It is difficult to answer two important questions that arise from the federal
preemption of these laws: how many subprime lenders are impacted and what share of
the market do they have. But I preliminarily conclude that this preemption, while unwise
in our dual banking system, will only have a moderately negative impact on the
effectiveness of state predatory lending laws because few predatory lenders and only a
small portion of predatory loans are originated by entities that benefit from preemption.
2. Possible Congressional Preemption.
Two bills introduced in the current Congressional session address predatory
lending. The Ney/Kanjorski bill makes minor modifications to HOEPA that, while
apparently consumer friendly, come at the price of complete preemption of state
predatory lending laws.477 Representatives Barney Frank (D-MA), Brad Miller (D-NC)
and Melvin Watt (D-NC) have recently introduced an alternative bill that expressly does
not preempt state predatory lending laws and models its substantive provisions on the
stringent North Carolina predatory lending law.478 There is no evidence that either of
these bills is likely to be passed this year.
Preemption, either regulatory or Congressional is premature, as Professor
Azmy argues. Because predatory lending is difficult to define, the trial and error
approach of the states has provided a fertile ‘laboratory of experimentation.’479 The
Frank/Miller/Watt bill recognizes this by adopting the useful provisions of the North
Carolina Law without preempting ongoing innovations by the states.
B.

Government-Sponsored Entities Will Have an Incremental Impact

Fannie and Freddie are the largest purchasers of residential mortgages on the
secondary market and are becoming more significant players in the subprime market.
Building on their buying guidelines for prime, conforming mortgages, Fannie and
Freddie have issued guidelines so that subprime originators can design their loans to
comply with their requirements.
475. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, HSBC to Buy a U.S. Lender for $14.2 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2002, at C1 (suggesting that most banks are concerned with reputational risks); Richard A. Oppel Jr. and
Patrick Mcgeehan, Along With a Lender, Is Citigroup Buying Trouble?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, § 3; at 1
(describing Citigroup’s reputational considerations upon entering subprime field).
476. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Advisory Letter 2003-2,
Guidelines for National Banks to Guard Against Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices 1-2 (2003)
[hereinafter OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2] (prohibiting national banks from engaging in certain lending
practices that are prone to abuse), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2003-2.pdf..
477. H.R. 1295 § 102 (lowering HOEPA points and fees trigger to 5%, albeit with a less restrictive definition
of points and fees) and § 106 (preempting state laws).
478. Legislative Update, American Banker at 5 (June 9, 2005); see Prohibit Predatory Lending Act 109TH
CONG, 1ST SESS., H.R. 1182 (Frank/Miller/Watt bill).
479. See generally Azmy, supra note 66, at 295.
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Fannie and Freddie have indicated that they will not purchase high cost home
loans and other loans with certain terms that they deem to be abusive, such as harsh
prepayment penalties.480 They have also indicated that they will not purchase high cost
home loans, as defined in the HOEPA.481 Fannie has also indicated that it will not buy
loans with mandatory arbitration clauses482 and Freddie has indicated that it will not buy
loans originated with single-premium credit insurance.483
The GSEs’ buying guidelines are far less restrictive than the policies of the
Privileged Raters. Because the GSEs impact a smaller portion of the subprime market
than the Privileged Raters do and because the GSEs are only imposing incremental
standardization on the subprime market, their impact should probably be more beneficial
than not.484 Their impact will be beneficial not only because of its limited impact, but
also because they have made good choices in drafting their buying guidelines: drawn
neither too restrictively nor too broadly, they have identified genuinely problematic
practices and loan terms to exclude. Whether the drafters of these guidelines were
conscious of the GSEs’ duty to the public interest or not, they struck a balance that few
found fault with.
C.

Privileged Raters Are Standardizing the Subprime Market at the
Expense of the Public Interest

The Privileged Raters have indicated that they will not rate securities backed by
pools of residential mortgages if any of those mortgages violate their rating guidelines
relating to predatory lending laws. Because the lack of a rating from at least one of these
agencies is the financial equivalent of a death sentence for a residential mortgage-backed
securities offering, the Privileged Raters are able to impose their own form of
standardization on the entire subprime market.
The Privileged Raters make more money in a growing residential mortgagebacked securities market because they charge issuers for their work in rating new
securities; thus, it is in the agencies’ self-interest to keep states from passing laws that
slow secondary market growth and cut into their income. Moreover, the Privileged
Raters’ own statements provide evidence that they are biased in favor of investors.

480. FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 04-06, supra note 173, at 3;F ANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 03-12, supra note 173;
FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 03-02, supra note 173; Letter from Michael C. May, Senior Vice President, Freddie
Mac, to All Freddie Mac Sellers and Services, Revisions to Freddie Mac’s Purchase Requirements Based on
the Enactment of Antipredatory Lending Legislation in New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Illinois, Maine
and Nevada (Nov. 26, 2003), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/resident/2003/
freddie_indyltr1126.pdf.
481. MICHAEL MAY LETTER, supra note 173; FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 04-06, supra note 173, at 3-4.
482. FANNIE ANNOUNCEMENT 04-06, supra note 173, at 3-4.
483. See supra note 173.
484. See William N. Eskridge, One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant
with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transactions, 70 VA L. REV.
1083 (1984) (arguing that Fannie and Freddie are in best position to standardize loan terms and balance
consumer protection with market needs).
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In addition to the theory that Privileged Raters are biased against the public
interest, there are other hypotheses, presented below, that may explain their behavior.
But even if these theories more accurately described the state of affairs, the history of the
Privileged Raters’ reaction to state predatory lending laws indicates that there are
systemic problems that result from the ability of the Privileged Raters to sell regulatory
licenses.485 Fundamentally, these problems derive from the power of the Privileged
Raters to standardize the subprime market on their terms and their terms alone.
In response to the critique outline in this Part, Privileged Raters may argue that
the tension between Privileged Rater actions and state predatory lending legislation
results from the fact that they are attempting to answer a different question than the one
that the state legislatures want them to answer. Privileged Raters, in their capacity as
advocates for investors, may be concerned with the incredibly remote possibility of a
catastrophic loss to a mortgage pool caused by a mammoth award in a predatory lending
suit. The state may just want them to address the average risk and severity of such
occurrences, which appear minimal.486 Thus, the Privileged Raters may argue, there is
no bias, just different goals.
This argument is not compelling. First, ratings, even investment-grade ratings,
are not intended to provide complete assurance of payment to investors, just an accurate
assessment of that risk.487 Second, the risk of catastrophic loss is limited to the
investors’ investment in a given pool.488 This type of risk of catastrophic loss is no
different from the risk that nearly all other securities bear for one reason or another; it is
just the particular potential cause, predatory lending laws, that differs.
Privileged Raters may also argue that while I have accurately described recent
events and their negative consequences for the public interest, such localized
consequences are acceptable “collateral damage” as the capital markets promote
globalized standardization and efficiency. For this argument to have merit, it should
demonstrate that the standardization that it is imposing is (1) relatively cost-free; and (2)
a material, even if just incremental, improvement in the efficiency of the capital markets.
The first prong is materially false: predatory lending costs consumers many billions of
dollars a year and preliminary studies suggest that predatory lending laws reduce
predatory lending.489 And there is no evidence that the second prong is true: lenders are
already required to comply with an extraordinarily complex set of regulations and the
predatory lending statutes do not materially add to such compliance costs. Indeed,
companies offer software packages to deal with the web of lending regulations.490 A
485. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
486. See supra note 342.
487. Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 28, at 716.
488. See supra note 107.
489. See, e.g., QUERCIA STUDY, supra note 279 (arguing that NC Law reduced predatory loans without
materially reducing subprime loans generally).
490. See, e.g., Appintelligence Website (describing web-based predatory lending due diligence product for
lenders), at http://www.appintelligence.com/preventpredatory/index.html; See CompliancEase Web
Site,available at
http://www.complianceease.com/mainsite/prod/prod_ac_overview.jsp?content=/opencms/CEContent/prod/pr
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related argument may be that the Privileged Raters should have the ability, at least more
so than the states, to determine how the secondary market functions because they are
bigger stakeholders in that market. This, of course, would be an extraordinary transfer of
power to private actors and should be the subject of an explicit decision-making process,
not the result of a slow and unseen accretion of power over decades.
Privileged Raters might also argue that standardization that benefits investors
ultimately benefits subprime borrowers because these two classes overlap and the
benefits to the former class negate the harm to the latter class. This argument, while
somewhat intuitive, does not hold up at all. While there is, indeed, some overlap between
the two classes it is neither a significant overlap, nor is there a way to ensure that those
harmed by the inappropriate standardization imposed by the Privileged Raters get a
proportionate share of the benefits that accrue to the investor class generally.
Privileged Raters might also argue that I am incorrect in describing their rating
guidelines as inaccurate. They might argue that if that were so, others would be able to
arbitrage loans governed by predatory lending statutes to their benefit. For instance, an
investor might accept private placements of unrated pools containing loans governed by
predatory lending statutes at a price that accurately reflects the risk of such statutes.
While theoretically true, the fact is that the immense power of the Privileged Raters can
dry up a mortgage market like Georgia’s so quickly that there is no time for such an
alternate market to develop.
Finally, Privileged Raters may argue that while I have accurately described
recent events, I have misinterpreted them. They might argue that their predatory lending
law guidelines are appropriate and unbiased. This position does not seem to have merit,
given the biases demonstrated in this article and given the less restrictive positions taken
by the GSEs.491
Fundamentally, the arguments of the Privileged Raters are quite hollow. There is
every reason, from their own statements to the empirical evidence to the structure of their
business models, to think that they take a pro-investor and/or pro-issuer stance on the
policies that they evaluate. There is no reason to believe that the Privileged Raters are
constituted to address the concerns of subprime borrowers and there is no reason to
believe that they consider the various sides of an issue as a legislature is likely (or, at
least, more likely) to do.

od_ac_overview_m.jsp&right=/opencms/CEContent/prod/r_power_to_protect.jsp (combining internet-based
compliance tool with insurance product).
491. Moody’s and Fitch may also argue that I am tarring them with too broad a brush, by grouping them with
S&P, which has taken the most draconian approach to state predatory lending laws. F
or my purposes, the
differences among the Privileged Raters are not that important because the typical securitization has ratings
by both Moody’s and S&P, at a minimum. See supra note 175. The failure to get a rating from S&P would
signal something is amiss to investors. Thus, the nature of the Privileged Raters oligopoly is that the market
and state legislatures must typically respond to the most draconian of S&P and Moody’s. And, much like a
good cop/bad cop duo, they both benefit from the systemic dilution of state predatory lending laws,
notwithstanding the fact that one of the partners presents a more kindly face.
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Thus, it appears that the standardization imposed upon the subprime market by
the Privileged Raters is biased against the public interest and is not acceptable as
‘collateral damage’ in the fight to create standardized capital markets.
VII.

MAKING THE PRIVILEGED RATERS TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
THEIR IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Rating agencies are entities that were historically considered to be mere
commentators on the comings and goings of the players in our free market economy
ensuring that objective information is widely disseminated to all.492 This view, however,
fails to take into account the privileged regulatory status that the SEC and other
government regulators have granted to the Privileged Raters. And as the scope of that
status increases, Privileged Raters have exploded in size and profitability.493 They now
have a gatekeeper function in the secondary market and they can allow their bias in favor
of a growing secondary market to influence decisions that also effect matters of great
concern to the public. This state of affairs should be remedied. The existing rating
agency literature provides a starting point for solving the problem of rating agency bias.
The existing rating agency literature does not look at them from the public’s
perspective, as does this article. Rather, it looks at rating agencies from the perspective
of investors and sometimes issuers. Nonetheless, the literature does suggest some ways
to limit the excessive power of the Privileged Raters so as to protect the public interest:
A. wait and see whether the subprime market standardizes in such a way as to make
concerns about rating agency bias irrelevant;
B. deregulate the Privileged Raters so as to remove their regulatory privileged
status; and
C. increase regulation of the Privileged Raters so as to ensure that they do not
negatively impact the public interest.
A.

Wait and See

If the history of the prime mortgage market is any guide, there is reason to
believe that the subprime market will standardize over time and that many predatory
behaviors will be driven from the market by various forces. In addition to the Privileged
Raters, this article has identified two standardizing forces: proposed federal legislation
and the Government Sponsored Entities.
Indeed, federal regulators are creating a unified regulatory regime that applies to
many of the largest subprime lenders. This standardization, in itself, will not drive out
predatory practices because the applicable federal standards are pro-issuer and because
many of the predatory lenders are not subject to the federal regulatory regime.494 The
492. See supra note 174.
493. Partnoy, supra note 29, at 648.
494. See generally Azmy, supra note 66, at 295.
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same holds true for the Ney/Kanjorski bill. That is, the mere fact that the federal
government is standardizing the subprime market does not mean that it is doing it in a
way that helps subprime borrowers.495 The Frank/Miller/Watt bill, on the other hand,
may promote pro-consumer standardization because it creates a floor of protections
without limiting states from building additional protections up from that floor.
Fannie and Freddie are also driving some of the standardization in the subprime
market. They are doing this by refusing to purchase loans with certain terms that they
consider to be abusive. But while GSEs were able to impose standardization on the
prime mortgage market, it is unclear that they will be able to do the same in the subprime
mortgage market. The subprime market, unlike the early prime market, has a number of
large lenders who need not follow the GSEs’ lead. The subprime market also has, by
definition, less consistency amongst its loan products. Thus, GSE-driven standardization,
while potentially beneficial, does not offer a sure-fire way to end predatory behavior.
The standardization imposed by the Privileged Raters is particularly troubling because
they perform a gatekeeping function to the capital markets. This gatekeeping function
gives an inordinate amount of power to the Privileged Raters and interferes with the
market’s ability to correct for the Privileged Raters’ bias against the public interest.
Because no standardization push looks like it will standardize the subprime
market in the near future and because predatory lending costs consumers billions of
dollars each year, the wait-and-see approach does not offer much promise.496
B.

Deregulation

There have been vociferous complaints that the SEC has created the Privileged
Rater oligopoly497. The SEC is in the process of issuing final, more transparent, rules
regarding NRSRO designation.498 As noted above, the Privileged Raters have been
criticized for a number of failings, not least of which is that they do not provide
particularly accurate information.499 Some argue that increased competition from other
rating agencies will increase the accuracy of the Privileged Raters’ pronouncements.
Such competition could push the Privileged Raters to accurately evaluate the risks
associated with state predatory lending legislation, instead of adopting a biased view that
495. Id.
496. See Engel & McCoy, Wall Street, supra note 28, at 716 (“Predatory lending continues to thrive despite
claims that the market will correct the problem. Investors, who because of information asymmetries could
potentially absorb some of the risks of predatory lending, are protected by pricing and securitization deals
and, therefore, have no incentive to police predatory lenders.”). There are plenty of examples of industries
with predatory practices that survive for decades, which also speaks against a wait-and-see approach. See,
e.g., Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Brandeis Way; a Case Study in the Workings of Democracy. (1938)
(describing long-term predatory practices in life insurance industry).
497. See supra Part IV.B.
498. Alec Klein, SEC Prepares to Change Rules for Credit Raters: Revision to Define National Designation,
February 25, 2005, Washington Post at E02.
499. SEC Representatives have argued, however, that market forces may keep the number of NRSROs down,
whatever the application process. See Hill, supra note 29,at 56.
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helps secondary market players by reducing investors’ risks and standardizing the
operation of the secondary market at the expense of subprime borrowers.
Indeed, Professor Azmy has argued that experimentation by the states in the
realm of predatory lending statutes has led to healthy innovation as states have struggled
with the problem of predatory lending.500 A similar argument applies in the context of
competition among rating agencies to provide the most accurate information to
investors.501 The more rating agencies that are involved in the assessment of the risks
that predatory lending statutes pose to investors, the more likely that the secondary
market will adopt appropriate standardization that would not be solely on the terms of the
Privileged Raters, but would also consider the interests of subprime borrowers. For this
to occur, the pool of rating agencies must expand so that there is competition among them
to provide the most accurate rating guidelines for predatory lending laws.
Some commentators, including Professor Partnoy, have suggested that rating
agencies should be extricated from government regulation altogether, leaving them as
pure providers of information and ending their role as sellers of regulatory licenses.502
Partnoy has argued that regulators could substitute reliance on a rating with reliance on a
“credit spread,” which is “the difference between the yield on the bond and the yield on a
risk-free bond of comparable structure and maturity.”503 Such a system would return the
Privileged Raters to their roots as providers of information and leave the granting of
regulatory licenses to regulators. No one, at least in the academic literature, has
persuasively demonstrated why this proposal is unworkable.504 Such a proposal would
end the Privileged Raters oligopoly and should increase the number of rating agencies
that consider the impact of predatory lending statutes. Just as experimentation by the
states is valuable to arrive at a well-balanced predatory lending law, empirical and
analytic experimentation by multiple rating agencies will help the secondary market
accurately evaluate the risk that such laws pose to investors.
Deregulating the Privileged Raters has much facial appeal,505 but ultimately, the
problem with this proposal is that their ratings are deeply enmeshed with a broad array of

500. Azmy, supra note 66.
501. See Beaver, supra note 231, at 7 (noting that regulation can reduce rating agency incentives to provide
good services).
502 See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 29,at 624 (arguing that SEC and other regulators should discontinue
regulatory licensing “by excising the portions of their rules that depend substantively on credit ratings”).
503. Id. at 705 n.388.
504. Cf. SEC Report, supra note 208, at 39 n. 106 (quoting Steven Schwarcz that rating agency ratings are
“intended to be . . . more conservatively stable” than credit spreads).
505. Indeed, the Privileged Raters themselves sometimes recommend this course. See Jerome S. Fons, Policy
Issues Facing Rating Agencies, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 344
(Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002) (““Historically, the major rating agencies have been against the use of
credit ratings in the regulatory process due to potential impact of rating changes on financial markets,
incentives to engage in ratings-shopping, the accuracy of ratings in reflecting the underlying risks, the use of
ratings as ‘automatic pilot” substitutes for proper credit analysis by lenders and investors, and the pressure
that might be brought to bear on the agencies if they were to become too closely tied to the regulatory process
– including regulation of the agencies themselves.”). It is unclear whether this stance is principled or
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regulatory regimes.506 Decoupling them throughout the international capital markets in
order to resolve the problems of the subprime mortgage market (a significant, but small
part of the entire international financial system) might amount to letting the tail wag the
dog. If deregulation of Privileged Raters is ultimately accomplished, it will be as a result
of broader forces than those present in the subprime market.
C.

Increased Regulation

Some have argued that rating agencies should be subject to greater regulation as
they are active participants in the secondary market underwriting process.507 Regulation
can take a number of forms, including traditional oversight by means of inspections and
record-keeping requirements; government input into the ratings process itself; and some
kind of periodic public review of the performance of the Privileged Raters.
There is general agreement that traditional regulation of rating agencies will not
be helpful as it is in other industries such as banking.508 And Professor Steven Schwarcz
warns that government input into the ratings process itself may impair the quality and
perceived quality of agency ratings:
if rating agency regulation were based on factors other than economic efficiency,
ratings would to some extent reflect those other factors. Investors, who typically
look for the highest economic return for a given level of safety, then would be
misled, undermining their confidence in the rating system and their willingness to
invest in rated securities.509
Professor Schwarcz argues that, at least in an economic context, “where health
and safety are not at issue, regulatory policy generally views” efficiency as the most
important concern of any given regulatory regime, although he does acknowledge that an
“exception might arise, however, where society has objectives in addition to economic
efficiency,” such as distributional objectives.510 Here, while there are no distributional
objectives, there is a concern that the Privileged Raters have a negative impact on the
public interest that must be addressed. Nonetheless, Schwarz is right to warn regulators
opportunistic (that is, Privileged Raters continue to benefit from their privileged regulatory status while
denying that it is important to their business model).
506. See, e.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement
and Capital Standards, A Revised Framework (June 2004) (describing new international standards for riskbased capital requirements that heavily relies on rating agencies).
507. See Gerard Uzzi, A Conceptual Framework for Imposing Statutory Underwriter Duties on Rating
Agencies Involved in the Structuring of Private Label Mortgage-Backed Securities, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
779, 798 (1996) (arguing that rating agency regulation is “inevitable”).
508. See Hill, supra note 29,at 89 (“Monitoring can fairly well be designed to catch egregious shirking or
fraud. But monitoring with the end of making lax behavior less lax should be less successful. The result is
likely to generate make-work, with no real improvement. Where rating agencies are failing is not in the
increment that traditional monitoring of this type could capture.”).
509. Schwarcz, supra note 29,at 13.
510. Id. at 10-11.
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not to kill the rating agency goose to get to the golden egg of bias-free ratings. The final
possible type of regulation, increased public comment, may help reduce that bias without
interfering with the content of the ratings themselves.
There have been a variety of proposals for increased public scrutiny regarding the
Privileged Raters, ranging from opportunities to comment to the right to appeal rating
decisions. One proposal has been to adopt a process like that used to renew broadcast
licenses.511 Under this proposal, NRSRO status would be periodically reviewed and the
public would be given the opportunity to comment. This proposal rests on the
assumption that NRSRO status will not be threatened if there are public complaints, but
rather that the Privileged Raters will (like broadcasters) seek to avoid public shaming for
acting inappropriately.512 While this proposal has merit, it is clearly no panacea.
The SEC’s 2005 Rule Proposal has made the increased regulation of Privileged
Raters a timely proposal. The renewal of broadcasting licenses provides a good
precedent for what that increased regulation can look like. And, while renewal
proceedings will not be a panacea (keeping in mind that S&P withstood some virulent
criticism for its actions in New Jersey), they should offer forum for addressing the
negative impact that the Privileged Raters have on the public interest.
Francis Bottini has proposed that the SEC be granted the power to issue a Writ of
Review to a rating agency to suggest that the agency reconsider a rating.513 This
proposal could be expanded to grant the SEC the power to suggest that a rating agency
reconsider an underwriting standard that appears to be too conservative or biased against
the public interest. If such a power was granted as part of greater regulatory oversight of
NRSROs, it might be an effective means of ensuring that Privileged Raters did not let
their biases interfere with their predatory lending legislation guidelines. Working out the
details of such a proposal must be left to another article and would probably only make
sense as part of an overhaul of the entire regulatory scheme for NRSROs.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Subprime lending has given low-income and moderate-income homeowners
some of the same financial options and resources that had been previously reserved for
prime borrowers. Unfortunately, this positive development has been shadowed by the
growing problem of predatory lending. This article builds on work of other scholars who
have demonstrated how the structure of the secondary market has allowed predatory
lending to explode in the subprime market. It ties this literature to the ratings agency
literature which suggests that Privileged Raters are biased against the public interest.

511. See Hill, supra note 29, at 89 (describing proposals of Fidelity and the Investment Company Institute).
512. Id. at 90.
513 Francis A. Bottini, Jr., An Examination of the Current Status of Rating Agencies and Proposals for
Limited Oversight of Such Agencies, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 579, 612 (1993). Some rating agencies allow
issuers to informally appeal a rating prior to it being released to the public. Rhodes, supra note 178, at 313
n.116.
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This article demonstrates how Privileged Raters have allowed their biases to
interfere with state efforts to end predatory lending in their jurisdictions. This article then
vets proposed Privileged Rater reforms and concludes that increased regulation of
Privileged Raters is called for to ensure that there is a way to hold them accountable for
their actions that negatively impact the public interest.
This article has implications for two important and broader areas of study: (i) the
gatekeeping function of Privileged Raters in the international financial markets;514 and
(ii) the replacement of local property law regimes with international, investor-friendly
regimes as globalization increases.515 By making visible the impact of Privileged Raters
on state predatory lending laws, this article makes clear that the increased standardization
that benefits the international investment community comes at a cost of localized
concerns like consumer protection. By doing so, it provides a theoretical basis for
arguing that regulators of rating agencies should consider the public interest when
regulating rating agencies.

514. The “gatekeeping” literature has, like most of the literature regarding rating agencies, focused on the
impact of regulation on investors, not the public interest. See, e.g., Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping" 29 IOWA J. OF
CORP. L., 735, 741 (2004) (describing gatekeeping function as a “duty to investors”).
515. See, e.g., Marc Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate Through the Eyes of a Property
Theorist, 33 ENVT’L L. 851 (2003) (arguing that NAFTA inappropriately replaces local regimes of property
law with investor-friendly ones).
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SUBPRIME STANDARDIZATION:
HOW RATING AGENCIES ALLOW PREDATORY LENDING TO
FLOURISH IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET
[David Reiss*]
ABSTRACT
Predatory lending, the origination of loans with abusive terms to homeowners, is
rampant in the subprime mortgage market. In the last few years, many states
responded to this problem by enacting consumer protection laws. Large segments
of the lending industry have opposed these laws. In large part because of these
complaints, momentum is building on three fronts to standardize the operations of
the subprime mortgage market.
First, federal regulators are preempting the application of these laws to a broad
array of lending institutions and Congress is considering legislation to preempt
their application to the remaining financial institutions that are still regulated by
such laws. Second, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the largest purchasers of
residential mortgages on the secondary market, have indicated that they will not
purchase loans with certain terms that they deem to be abusive. And finally, the
three major rating agencies indicated that they will not rate securities backed by
pools of residential mortgages if any of those mortgages violate their rating
guidelines relating to predatory lending laws.
While the lending industry frequently promotes the increased standardization of
the secondary mortgage market as an approach that will reduce predatory
behavior without hurting legitimate lenders, this article reviews these three pushes
to standardize the subprime mortgage market to determine if they will achieve
that goal. It concludes that the federal preemption of these laws is premature, that
the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchasing guidelines will have an
incrementally beneficial impact and, most importantly, that the rating agency
guidelines will benefit investors in and issuers of mortgage-backed securities at
the expense of homeowners.
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